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A high cost for more feet on the
ground
By Sreeram Chaulia
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
United States has grown highly dependent on Pakistan for the
prosecution of its interests in Central Asia. The second
American war in Afghanistan in two decades warranted a
reunion of
Washington and Islamabad, as if an old
film was being remade with new faces. President George W
Bush and president General Pervez Musharraf played the roles
originally enacted by president Ronald Reagan and General
Zia ul-Haq.
The twist in the remake's storyline, however, was that the
colloquial American tag - "bad guys" - was assigned not to
alien Russians but to a section of the Afghans themselves -
the fundamentalist Taliban and their international
comrades-in-arms, al-Qaeda. So, while the original movie
ended on a happy note for Washington with the final scene
depicting the humiliating withdrawal of Russian tanks in
1989, the new one is turning into a dragging script that is
unlikely to earn profits for the producers.
If the informal peace talks with the Taliban initiated by
the beleaguered Hamid Karzai government in Kabul and
facilitated by Saudi authorities yield fruit, the picture
may have to end with the supposed heroes - American GIs -
beating a
retreat after declaring a pyrrhic
"victory" of some semblance of restored Afghan stability for
nation building.
For the moment though, the American stomach to fight on in
Afghanistan is intact and set to receive an injection of
fresh troops a la Iraq's "surge". The liberals' labeling of
the intervention in Afghanistan as a "good war" in contrast
to the "bad war" in Iraq ensures enough political capital in
Washington for redoubling the force levels in the former
theater.
The shocking aspect of the proposed American surge in
Afghanistan - an influx of up to 30,000 more American
soldiers to add to the already to 30,000 there - is that it
runs counter to the laments of the United Nations that
civilian deaths at the hands of North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) forces are worsening day by day and
antagonizing locals. The UN is quoted by the Associated
Press as reflecting the "growing uneasiness that an increase
in US troops next year could bring more civilian deaths".
However that be, the impending Barack Obama administration's
resolve to dilate force levels in Afghanistan remains
unshaken. With the arrival of more US troops in early 2009,
their logistical backups will have to be expanded. Here,
Pakistan makes a re-entry as a geographically ideal storage
and supply base that has its own version of the "bad guys" -
the Tehreek-i-Taliban, and an out-of-control intelligence
agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Despite these
formidable obstacles, Pakistan currently accounts for 80% of
all supplies, which come truck-laden through the Khyber and
Khojak passes to Western forces in Afghanistan.
Does the forthcoming surge imply ever-greater US dependence
on Pakistan? To the contrary, recent daring raids by the
Taliban on Afghanistan-bound carrier trucks in Pakistan's
North-West Frontier Province have awoken NATO to the perils
of over-reliance on Islamabad. On December 13, the London
Times quoted an anonymous NATO official as saying that a new
"northern supply route" would be opened in the next eight
weeks.
For a multilateral conduit to work, Washington will have to
muster agreements with Central Asian states that are firmly
in the Russian sphere of influence. The new American surge
could therefore restart the tug-of-war between the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization and NATO. American confidence that
Moscow and Beijing will not object to US commercial transit
agreements in Central Asia are misplaced because a supply
line traversing through countries will involve security
arrangements and possible return of mini-bases, Pentagon
sleuths and "military advisers" to the region.
Analysts are divided about the chances of Tehran being roped
in as part of the new alternative route. Former diplomat M K
Bhadrakumar wrote in Asia Times Online that "Iran is a no-go
area" for Washington and that this option is practically
ruled out. (See
All roads lead out of Afghanistan December 20, 2008).
However, Syed Saleem Shahzad, ATol's Pakistan Bureau chief,
disclosed that NATO "might have found assistance from Iran"
for non-military supplies like food and oil to be
transported overland to Afghanistan. (See
Pakistan's spies reined in December 25, 2008.) If his
sources are accurate, then it could mean that
Obama's promise to negotiate and engage
with Iran is being factored into the makings of this
potential cooperation between erstwhile foes.
Should alternative logistical routes open up to bookend the
surge, what will be their effect on American dependence on
Pakistan? The unreliability of Pakistan as an ally has
gathered consensus in Washington, but thus far the argument
went that Islamabad was a necessary evil due to the
expedience of geography and the local knowledge of the ISI.
This line could alter drastically if alternative transit
routes become functional. Already, the ISI's record in
sharing intelligence with NATO in Afghanistan is badly
tarnished. If new supply lines materialize, the US-Pakistan
special relationship could be in jeopardy.
The implications of the US breaking free from dependence on
Pakistan are multiple. It will magnify American pressure on
Islamabad to rein in jihadi terrorism against India. The
infamous "restraining hand" of Washington on New
Delhi every time a cross-border terrorist
attack occurs on Indian soil will be history since the
Afghan war effort will not require Pakistani cooperation to
the same extent as today. Within Pakistan, the loss of the
American "thy hand, great monarch" will weaken the hold of
the security establishment on domestic and foreign policies
and possibly strengthen civil society.
The surge in Afghanistan is thus pregnant with
possibilities. It is guaranteed to exacerbate the sufferings
of Afghan civilians and unlikely to succeed militarily in
comparison to its Iraqi counterpart. At the same time, it
presages more hopeful tidings of an India-Pakistan
relationship that is devoid of subversion, terrorism and
animosity.
One must not lose the temporal perspective on the surge. In
the long run, everyone believes that a political settlement
between the elected government in Kabul and so-called
"moderate" Taliban will be the final act of the Afghan war.
The surge and a major
US
military presence would end once the will
for sacrifices of treasure and blood saps in the American
political class. A Western military exit from Central and
South
Asia is conceivable due to the prospects
of lasting economic recession and financial unsustainability
of costly wars. At present, however, the surge show goes on.
Sreeram Chaulia is a researcher on international
affairs at the Maxwell School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs in
Syracuse, New York.
(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights
reserved. Please contact us about
sales, syndication and
republishing.) |
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