Power play behind Bangladesh's
mutiny
By Sreeram Chaulia
As the body count from the bloody mutiny by the Bangladesh
Rifles (BDR) crosses 140 amid the exhuming of fresh graves,
questions arise whether this pre-planned event could have
been motivated by simple economic grievances.
The standard line being disseminated in public about the
two-day running battle between the BDR and the Bangladesh
army in urban centers of Dhaka, and in Teknaf, Cox's Bazaar,
Naikhongchari and Sylhet, is that the rebels were demanding
better pay, clearance to participate in lucrative United
Nations peacekeeping missions and a change in the command
and control structure of the force.
Though these are by no means petty concerns, the scale of
the mutiny and the brutality of its perpetrators were far
more vicious than rationally required to press mere economic
demands. If pay scales were the principal bone of
contention, BDR cadres could easily have resorted to the
standard trade union tactic of going missing without leave
or refusing to take orders from their superiors. That they
could take senior
army
officers hostage in the BDR headquarters
in Dhaka and massacre so many of them suggests strongly that
the forces behind the upheaval had their eyes set on a much
bigger prize - political power.
The first indication that the BDR revolt was politically
driven comes from its timing. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina
had barely settled into her post, taking oath of office on
January 6 after her Awami League party swept the
general
elections which had been long delayed due
to military intervention.
For nearly two years before her victory, the Bangladeshi
military had taken virtual control of the country in the
name of a civilian caretaker government. If the BDR had pent
up frustrations owing to economic reasons, why did they not
attempt a mutiny when the Bangladesh army was in charge?
That they chose to attack just after civilian rule under a
secular and liberal leader was restored is one sign of the
elaborate plot behind their actions.
Already, hints are emerging that the BDR mutiny enjoyed the
secret backing of some Bangladesh army officers who had been
sidelined by Army Chief Moeen Ahmed. Ahmed is widely seen as
a secular officer who clamped down on the fundamentalist
outfits that had been close to the previous civilian regime
of Begum Khaleda Zia, the leader of the Bangladesh National
Party (BNP).
Ahmed made a commitment to roll back the "Talibanization" of
Bangladesh, which was going on for several years of Begum
Zia's rule. The latitude and state legitimacy that Begum Zia
showered on the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and
Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) had given Islamists
free rein to terrorize Bangladesh's Hindu minorities and
enforce strict moral restrictions on the country's majority
Muslims and secular intellectuals.
Since the 1975 military coup d'etat that overthrew Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman's civilian rule in Bangladesh, pro-Islamic
forces have gone from strength to strength within
the
army ranks.
The dictatorships of General Ziaur Rahman (1976-1981) and of
General Muhammad Ershad (1982-1986) took Bangladesh down the
path of Islamic theocracy and boosted the pelf and power of
Islamist officers.
During Begum Zia's second term in office (2001-2006), a
large swathe of the Bangladesh army was infiltrated by JI
and JMB elements to strengthen the permanent Islamist
constituency in the country's most powerful institution.
Many rank-and-file and non-commissioned officers of the
Bangladesh military today have Islamist educational
backgrounds because madrassa (Islamic school)
graduates joined in large numbers and brought with them a
fundamentalist fervor that coexisted uneasily with the more
secular top echelons of the army led by Ahmed.
There is every possibility that the BDR mutiny in Dhaka was
backed by "pro-Islam" army officers. This is why it is being
rumored that Ahmed will have to carry out yet another purge
within the army after the failed uprising.
The geopolitical dimension of internal feuds within the
Bangladesh army has to do with the India-Pakistan rivalry in
South
Asia. From the very beginning, the
"pro-Islam" segments of Bangladeshi society and the army had
sympathies for Pakistan and opposed the independence of
Bangladesh in 1971. The JI leadership was at the forefront
of mass atrocities on behalf of the Pakistan army on the eve
of Bangladeshi independence. When the secular Hasina
returned to power in January, she implemented a bold
initiative to seek war crimes prosecutions with UN
assistance of the JI figures who spearheaded the killings in
1971.
Just a few days prior to the BDR mutiny, trials had begun
against the JI chief, Matiur Rahman Nizami, and nine others
for "carrying [out a] massacre during the war of
independence in 1971". Hasina's steps against the
fundamentalists were based on detailed investigations and a
collection of documents over a long period by
non-governmental organizations and
associations of former freedom fighters. That the JI and JMB
would hit back in the form of terrorist attacks or serial
bomb blasts in the country was expected, but few thought
that they could attempt a mutiny through sympathizers in the
army and the BDR.
The BDR itself is staffed entirely by Bangladesh
army officers, many of whom have
distinctly anti-India and pro-Islamic leanings. In 2005,
BDR's chief Jehangir Alam Chowdhary alleged that "some
criminal elements from India had colluded with the
Bangladeshi groups" to carry out the sensational 500-bomb
serial attacks all over the country.
Although all evidence suggested that the attacks were the
handiwork of the JI and the JMB, the BDR insisted that the
blasts had a sinister foreign hand. The BDR's forces were
also been involved in a major security incident along the
border with India in 2001, when 16 Indian soldiers were
killed. The shared perception of Indian intelligence
agencies is that the BDR's lower rung cadres, who executed
the massacres in last week's failed mutiny, were completely
under the JI and the JMB's ideological sway.
General Ahmed himself was not present in the BDR
headquarters when the mutiny broke out, but he was a likely
target of the plotters because of his perceived secular and
pro-India character. In March 2008, he visited India and met
the top civilian and military leadership, generating
newfound confidence in
New
Delhi that they could do business with
him. The assessment in India for the past two years has been
that the caretaker government under Ahmed's supervision was
cracking down on the "pro-Islam" juggernaut that had gone on
the rampage during Begum Zia's rule.
The master plan of "Talibanizing" Bangladesh with state
power and the backing of religious sections of the army and
the BDR fell flat when Ahmed shepherded the transition to
democracy in December 2008 and installed the secular Sheikh
Hasina in power. The election of Hasina was a severe blow to
jihadi sections in Bangladeshi society, the army and the
paramilitaries who were intent on Islamizing the country
along the model of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. If there was a
combine which badly wanted to stage yet another coup d'etat,
it was this coalition of "Islam-pasand" ("Fond of
Islam" in Bengali) elements desirous of a counter-revolution
against Hasina's government.
Hasina's government and Ahmed's army are obviously going to
try to get to the root of the matter in the following days,
and they will probe Indian "leaks" of a Pakistani hand in
the affair. What is certain is that the BDR putsch had grand
religious and geopolitical causes which are far more
profound than the relative trifle of a salary raise.
Sreeram Chaulia is a researcher on international
affairs at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public
Affairs in Syracuse,
New
York.
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