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BOOK REVIEW
A systems solution to
the Middle East
Israel and the Persian Gulf: Retrospect and Prospect
by Gawdat Bahgat
Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia
Although the Middle East has commanded the attention of
analysts for decades, few have studied its volatility in
terms of its two subsystems - the Levant (Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon and Syria) and the Persian Gulf (Iran, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia and the smaller Gulf monarchies). Gawdat Bahgat, a
political-science professor, argues in this new book that
developments in one subsystem echo in the other and that a
comprehensive region wide peace has to address sources of
instability in both.
The author first provides an empirical summary for his
diagnosis by surveying recent events indicating the
strong links between the two subsystems. Continuing Israeli
military operations against Palestinian civilians drew
outrage from Arabs
and Iranians in the Gulf region, even as the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, pressured Gulf states to
dissociate themselves from radical Palestinian and Lebanese
groups.
Saudi Arabia's 2002 peace plan for Palestinians and Israelis
was meant to absorb some of this pressure from Washington.
The 2003 war on Iraq led to the introduction of the
"roadmap" peace plan, underscoring the connection between
changes in the Gulf and peace in the Levant. Bahgat reminds
readers that a similar segue occurred after the 1991 Gulf
War in the form of the Madrid peace conference.
With Iraq under US occupation, Baghdad's future interaction
with Israel holds interesting possibilities. The Gulf
states' attitude to Israel was not always negative, the shah
of Iran (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi) being the case in
point. While ideological orientations (pan-Arabism and
political Islam) demand an anti-Israel stance, economic and
strategic interests moot a more accommodative policy in the
Gulf states. The author sees a "relative predominance of
national interests" emerging, which suggests less hostile
relations with Israel in the future. Slow "de-ideologization"
of the region renders a detente "desired and possible". (p
12)
Bahgat describes four caveats to this optimistic scenario.
First, leaders use foreign policy as a tool to achieve
domestic goals. Anti-Israel approaches serve as legitimizing
mechanisms for Arab regimes. Second, since the Gulf states
do not share borders with Israel, it is less costly to adopt
a more belligerent stand against Israel than it is for the
"frontline" states that are its immediate neighbors. Third,
the issue of ethnic and religious minorities and their
treatment hardens positions on both sides. Fourth, given the
relative lack of political institutionalization in the Gulf
states, the world views of individual personalities - an
unpredictable factor - determines foreign-policy lines.
Iran's relations with Israel before its 1979 revolution were
cooperative because of perceived threats of Soviet
penetration and the rising tide of Arab nationalism led by
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Iran's territorial
disputes with Arab states over Bahrain, Abu Musa, Greater
and Lesser Tunbs and Khuzestan propelled the shah's
determination to seek non-Arab regional allies. Iranian
dependence on US economic and military aid and the US Jewish
lobby buttressed the close alliance between Iran and Israel.
The shah's advisers believed that "ties to the Jewish state
could gain Iran considerable mileage in Washington". (p 21)
Israel prized the value of Iran as a transit point for Iraqi
Jews on their way to the Promised Land and was also
influenced by the freedoms Iranian Jews have historically
enjoyed. Both ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Supreme Leader
Ali Khamenei tolerated Iranian Jews in ways Arab regimes did
not.
Bahgat judges Khomeini-era Iranian policy toward Israel as
"not completely separated from pragmatic national
interests". (p 18) The Iran-Contra affair (Israeli arms were
supplied to Iran with US complicity in the early 1980s) is
an illustration. Under Khamenei, ideology is not irrelevant
but moderated by the decline in Iranian living standards,
economic stagnation and direct and indirect US sanctions.
Iran also has internal forces pushing for a more pragmatic
position regarding Israel on the grounds that Tehran need
not be "more Palestinian than the Palestinians themselves".
Unlike the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iranian support for
Hezbollah in Lebanon represents a direct national-security
interest for Tehran. Strong traditional links between
Shi'ites in Iran and Lebanon (both follow the Ithna
Ashariyah sect) gird this strategic alliance. Yet, Bahgat
points out, the rise of moderate elements in Iran
facilitated Hezbollah's softening as a political party in
Lebanon, a process intensifying after the Israeli withdrawal
from south Lebanon in 2000.
Among Iran's main motivations to acquire nuclear capability
is the Israeli nuclear asymmetry in the Middle East and
Jerusalem's refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Tehran considers nuclear capability necessary to deter
potential attacks by the "the world's sixth-ranking nuclear
power". To occlude Osirak-style operations by Israel, Iran
has taken precautions by scattering its nuclear
installations and protecting them with sophisticated defense
equipment. Tehran also warns of retaliation on Israel's
nuclear reactor at Dimona if Jerusalem takes direct action.
Bahgat sums up the Iran-Israel scorecard by remarking that
"despite some current setbacks, pragmatism is gaining ground
at the expense of extremism". (p 59)
Iraq has been one of the strongest opponents of the Jewish
state since its creation, without a hint of compromise or
rapprochement. The country's location and ambitious
leadership formulated a national perception that Baghdad has
a leading role in shielding the Arab world from Israel and
Iran. Imbued with Arab nationalism and a long-running
alliance with Moscow, every government in pre-2003 Iraq has
been anti-Israeli and anti-West. Persecution and
discrimination of Iraqi Jews and Israeli encouragement of
Iraqi Kurdish separatism (through weapons deliveries and
intelligence sharing) added fuel to the fire for years.
Saddam Hussein's militant position toward Israel was aimed
at asserting Iraq's regional leadership and status. Aware
that geographical distance made an aggressive policy toward
Israel cost-effective, he cultivated strong ties with the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and rival radical
Palestinian outfits. During the Iran-Iraq war, Israel
favored Iran, but once Saddam thawed his anti-Israeli
rhetoric for practical reasons, it also explored avenues of
rapprochement with Baghdad. This was in coordination with
the US tilt toward Iraq in the 1980s. However, Saddam's
relentless quest for weapons of mass destruction brought
relations back to the boiling point.
During the Gulf War, Iraq launched Scud missiles against
Israel, but Jerusalem responded with uncharacteristic
self-restraint because of heavy US arm-twisting. These Iraqi
strikes altered the security environment of the entire
Middle East by ensuring that "Israel would not have to
handle Saddam alone and that the US would maintain a
hegemonic presence". (p 93) Also, non-conventional
capabilities and the methods to deliver them became an
option of warfare in the region. Israel's unprecedented
military operation that destroyed Saddam's Osirak reactor in
1981 had already opened the ledger of proliferation of
chemical and biological weapons as the Arab response to a
sense of growing demoralization, weakness and victimization.
Bahgat assesses that the 2003 war on Iraq has considerably
diminished Arab states' ability to form an eastern front
against Israel and enhanced Jerusalem's strategic advantages
in the Middle East. US military and political presence in
Iraq benefits the Israeli standing in the region and might
even herald a gradual revival of the Haifa-Mosul pipeline to
pump Iraqi oil to Israel's major port city.
Saudi Arabia's attitude to Israel can be explained by US
pressures to adopt a moderate stand and pulls in the
opposite direction from the kingdom's domestic constituency.
The powerful load of Islam on Saudi policy and the alliance
between the royal family and the Wahhabi movement ensure
that the Saudi perception of the world is drawn from the
Koran. Riyadh considers Zionism an anti-Arab and anti-Islam
phenomenon whose goal is to occupy Muslim land. However,
Bahgat reminds that "the Saudi state's national interests
are not mutually exclusive with those of Israel". (p113) In
the past, they shared common enemies in Nasser's Egypt,
Khomeini's Iran and Saddam's Iraq.
Although Saudi Arabia and Israel also have special
relationships with the US in common, the Saudis always
resented Washington's support to Israel and offered
financial backing to the "frontline" Arab states and the
PLO. Saudi money has been used to strengthen pro-Western
Arab regimes and weaken radical Palestinian groups and Arab
states. Compared with Iran or Saddam's Iraq, Saudi Arabia
has a less strident take on Israel and it is willing to make
conditional peace with it in the context of a pan-Arab
consensus.
Bahgat observes that the fall in real terms of Saudi oil
revenues has reduced Riyadh's clout over the other five
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council to speak with one
voice against Israel. This contrasts the hitherto leading
role played by the Saudis in drawing Arab strategy toward
the Jewish state. After the 1973 oil shock made Riyadh an
economic power, most Arab decisions related to Israel were
made in consultation with the Saudis. Now, the kingdom is on
a weaker platform to dictate Arab policy toward Israel.
Overall, Bahgat summarizes the Saudi disposition to Israel
as one of "cautious acceptance". Despite animosity, Saudi
Arabia is not Israel's No 1 foe. Both prince (now King) Fahd
bin Abdul Aziz's peace plan (1981) and Abdullah bin
Abdulaziz al-Saud's peace plan (2002) explicitly included a
conditional recognition of Israel. The latter offered Israel
full peace with political, economic and cultural
normalization, a bold initiative that has not won many
backers because of the continuing violence in West Bank and
Gaza.
Last, Bahgat takes up the relations of the smaller Gulf
monarchies (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates) with Israel. These energy-rich mini-states gave
generous monetary aid to the "frontline states" and
Palestinian fighters from the 1970s, but grew less critical
of Israel after the Gulf War. Some have low-level diplomatic
and commercial contacts with Israel, maintaining that "the
road to Washington goes through Tel Aviv". (p 140)
Traditions of relative tolerance and acceptance of foreign
cultures facilitated these demarches toward Israel. Oman's
lead in accepting and dealing with Israel reflects
deep-seated pragmatism and is in part a reaction to the
Palestinian involvement in the Dhufar rebellion, which
threatened the sultanate. Qatar's opening is based on
assessment of Israel as an attractive market for natural-gas
exports and as a transit route to Europe.
However, the large Palestinian lobbies in these small Gulf
monarchies and the spiteful attitude of the regional great
powers toward Israel complicate rapprochement. Bahgat
predicts that the mini-states are "not likely to pursue full
diplomatic relations with the Jewish state without a
solution with Syria and a recognition of basic Palestinian
rights". (p 143)
For two generations, the Persian Gulf states viewed Israel
through ideological lenses. The deaths of Nasser in 1970 and
of Khomeini in 1989 weakened ideological appeals and
strengthened national-interest calculations. Israel "is seen
by a growing number of Arabs and Iranians as a Middle
Eastern state that they have to live with". (p 146) This
coincides with a global trend, with Russia turning into a
major trade, scientific and military partner of Israel. The
removal of Saddam's regime eliminated a principal adversary
of Israel in the Gulf. Iran finds itself surrounded by US
troops from all directions and it may have little choice but
to embark on a detente with Israel.
Ultimately, Bahgat emphasizes, much depends on the domestic
configurations of the Gulf states. "So long as there is
little domestic peace, there is unlikely to be regional
peace". (p 152) Saudi Arabia's political and economic
reforms have a long way to go. Iran's home environment is
freer than that of its Arab neighbors, but there is no
guarantee that the reform path will succeed. In essence, the
way domestic politics evolve in these two linchpin states
will determine the overall systemic condition for peace in
the Middle East.
Bahgat's original contribution takes the onus away from the
theater of Palestinian-Israeli conflict to the larger
picture involving the powerhouses of the Persian Gulf. It
successfully posits that there can be no lasting peace in
the Middle East without addressing grievances in both the
Levant and the Gulf.
Israel and the Persian Gulf: Retrospect and Prospect
by Gawdat Bahgat. Gainesville, University Press of Florida,
2006. ISBN: 0-8130-2908-2. Price US$59.95, 188 pages.
(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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