March 30


	March 30, 2002	atimes.com

India/Pakistan

BOOK REVIEW
India as a world power
A review of Stephen P Cohen's India: Emerging Power. Brookings Institution Press, 2001. US price $28.95. ISBN- 0-8157-0006-7. 377 Pages.

By Sreeram Chaulia

In 1979, long before he came to earn the tag "the doyen of South Asian strategic studies", Stephen Cohen co-authored a slim volume titled India: Emergent Power? forecasting that 25 years thence India would be a global force to reckon with engaged by the United States. This new exegesis (without the question mark) is a rendezvous with the old prognosis marking Cohen's attempt to shatter the myth that "India is always destined to be 'emerging' but never actually arriving" (p 2). He ends up ranking India in the league of great powers and makes a unique attempt to assess critically the weaknesses, strengths and prospects India has as a major player in world politics. Languishing for decades on the fringes of America's radar screen and the two great Asian powers, China and Japan, India has, according to Cohen, finally "arrived". This calls for a broader appreciation of its rise to eminence and its role in today's fluid world order: "India has long been counted among the have-nots. This situation is rapidly changing, which is what will make it such an interesting 'great' power for the next dozen years" (p 35).

Cohen's classificatory genius is evident throughout the book, beginning with a dissection of the world outlooks of India's strategic elites. He divides dominant foreign policy attitudes into the "Nehruvian Tradition" (1947-62), "Militant Nehruvianism" (1962-87), "Realism" (Jaswant Singh, K C Pant, et al) and "Revitalism" (the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh-driven clash of civilizations vision), the latter two working in tandem since the late '90s. New regional perspectives, heralded by economically dynamic states such as Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra, are also gaining foothold and eroding Delhi-centric perspectives of the world. Beyond these variations and mind-boggling "diversity in diversity", the historical memory of a great Indian civilization and the notion that India has a special mission and place in the world are commonalities that will continue to motivate Indian strategic thought, be it of the left, center or right.

Indian declamations of representing a great civilization-state have often irritated foreign diplomats and observers as smacking of excessive moral hectoring and arrogance. Cohen argues for a psychological understanding of Indian negotiation styles as inherent in the country's history and the class backgrounds of its elites, which "give rise to a defensive arrogance and acute sensitivity to real and perceived slights" (p 86). Indian diplomats and security experts should both shed their "getting to no" rigidity in negotiations, since an emerging power cannot afford to be marginalized at major world fora as "an India that can't say yes".

Sizing up domestic Indian achievements and failures, Cohen uses V S Naipaul's characterization of India as a "revolutionary state experiencing political, social and economic upheaval since the late '80s" (p 97). The most recent and important of these revolutions, which has propelled India's claim to great power status, is economic. One of the world's fastest-growing and largest economies since 1991, India has successfully shrugged off the "Hindu rate of growth", made a mark in the New Economy and opened its industries to global competition. Strategic spinoffs of economic advancement could result in greater research and development (R&D) allocations for missile development, military refurbishment and space technology. However, drastic regional and class inequalities in distribution of the fruits of liberalization need to be redressed immediately; as Cohen states, "the facts of Indian poverty are undeniable" and no great power can ignore mass deprivation in its midst (p 103). The manner in which India handles caste churning and religious fundamentalism will also determine its status as a great power.

Militarily, Cohen traces the evolution of Indian security policy from a time when prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru treated "defense as development" to the present day when the depth of Indian weaponry and nuclear know-how has attained a level of sophistication allowing future governments to earn, like China, valuable foreign exchange by exporting arms in the international market. In terms of readiness, the Indian military has moved from "a policy based on one specific enemy, Pakistan, to one based on two enemies (1963-72) ... and since then to acquire a capacity to deter any external enemy" (p 144). Apart from the burst of military cooperation with the West between 1963 and 1965, the Soviet/Russian link has been the backbone of Indian military progress, although patterns of procurement are becoming more even since the United States and India have drawn closer. Indian opinion "still remains skeptical or at least divided about the virtues of military power" (p 154), and unless the economy maintains its rapid growth, it will be difficult for policy-makers to sustain military modernization.

As a nuclear power, India has trodden a "slow march" since independence, halting for lengthy, wide-ranging and intensive debates before crossing various thresholds. From the era when purely moral arguments were dished out against nuclear proliferation and discriminatory treaties such as the Non Proliferation Treaty to the forthright comment by Arundhati Ghosh, India's envoy to the United Nations, in 1997 that India would not sign on to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for "security reasons", the country has come a long way. Cohen breaks down the current Indian debate about the nuclear program into four camps: "Rejectionists" (who advocate the "equitable elimination" of WMD, or weapons of mass destruction), "Pragmatists/Hawks" (K Subrahmanyam & Co who want overt weaponization, albeit with a "minimum credible deterrent" in sight), "Maximalists" (Bharat Karnad and several defense chiefs, exhorting deployment levels for India to be able to fight and win a nuclear war), and "Abolitionists" (Gandhians such as Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik). A cocktail of the first three camps is ruling the roost, but risks of accidental nuclear usage and the consequences of "Bombing Bombay" should not be sidelined if India wants to project itself as a "responsible" nuclear power.

Although Indians persistently deny that their nukes are country-specific, Cohen denotes Pakistan, China and the US as three potential nuclear adversaries. "The security of India in relation to Pakistan depends not on the quality of the Indian nuclear force or the rationality of an Indian decision-making system, but on the integrity of Pakistan's chain of command" (p 186). To pose a feasible deterrent to Beijing's bomb, India must develop sea-borne nuclear capability fitted with ballistic missiles. Introduction of tactical nuclear weapons along the Himalayas might be counter-productive. For forestalling USS Enterprise-like incidents or a US-led Kosovo-style operation from ever being launched in South Asia, India will have to improve its "triad" capability. Another interesting recommendation Cohen proffers is that unwarranted official secrecy should be eschewed for the Indian nuclear arsenal to "allow outsiders a glimpse of its capabilities and persuade opponents that it has a deterrent capability" (p 192).

In order to play a grander strategic role, India's Cold War with Pakistan will have to be resolved, says Cohen, since India's net military power will remain the sum of its own capabilities minus those of Pakistan. A normal India-Pakistan relationship could help India assume a place among major Asian and global powers, for then "it would not be a question, as it is now, of Indian power minus Pakistani power, but of an India free to exercise its influence over a much wider range without the distraction and cost of a conflict with a still-powerful Pakistan" (p 227). The "institutionalized distrust" of India found in the Pakistan army is a big obstacle to normalization, not to mention the strong strategic and identity-based stakes for both sides in Kashmir. With China moderating its support for Pakistan's claims on Kashmir and intense US pressure on ending Jihadi terrorism, Cohen feels optimistic about peaceful solutions. India has to move over from frozen, permanent hostility to resolution, if not for pacifist motives then to further its great power ambitions.

Geostrategically, India is gaining acceptance as an "Asian Power". For its "Inner Ring" - comprising Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka - India is a hegemon and a superpower. India's foreign policy toward these countries has a "domestic quality", ie an intimate relationship with the societies of these states. The interventionist and "big brother" tendencies of India appear natural from a South Block mandarin's lenses, but they have also disrupted meaningful regionalism. Cohen hopes that with new Indian economic links to the outside world, "the region may well be on the verge of a new spell of cooperation", although events have belied previous optimism. The Outer Ring - Central, West and Southeast Asia - has the most happening as far as India's standing in Asia is concerned. Since 1992, India has warmed up to Israel and dramatic changes have been instituted through a new "look east policy", such as the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum, BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic Cooperation), BOBCOM (Bay of Bengal Community), and the Mekong-Ganga Initiative with Indo-China. The balancing of Chinese influence is also being sought in Central Asia with the aid of moderate Islamic Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) republics. India's relations with China have steadily improved, although "awareness in each country about the other is abysmal ... and mired in stereotypes" (p 257). Competition between the two Asian giants is perhaps inevitable, but Cohen advises India "to build on areas of common interest with China and avoid a confrontation for which India is not prepared" (p 264). India's preference for a polycentric, as opposed to a unipolar world, offers ample scope for cooperation with its northern neighbor.

Indo-US ties have been on the upside since the end of the Cold War, though several mental blocks carrying over from pre-1991 years persist. Indian thinkers consistently rationalize US support of Pakistan or concerns about non-proliferation as indications of America trying to keep India from rising. Americans find Delhi's diplomacy somewhat like France's - contrary, oppositional and pompous. Yet disputes over India's nuclear program "are likely to become less important in the next few years", with several other factors like economics, emigres, counter-terrorism and China bringing the two largest democracies together. Cohen persuasively seconds Arvind Subrahmaniam's idea of a mutually beneficial India-US free trade agreement to reduce tariff barriers on Indian textiles and agricultural products and improve US access to computer software.

In conclusion, Cohen wraps up this eminently researched and intuitive study with the confidence that India has begun overcoming many of its deficiencies and has discovered new strengths. Given India's adoption of new economic policies, its experiment in democracy ("the greatest in human history" and "a task of awe-inspiring magnitude"), its growing military and nuclear prowess and its budding strategic culture, "it would seem that the future favors India" (p 309). The author has done ample justice to his reputation as the maestro of South Asian security studies with this brilliant, if sometimes refractive, book. It is one for every theoretician, strategist and politico's private collection. Indian readers will find it especially cockle-warming.

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