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Tiger in the dragon's yard
By Sreeram Chaulia
This year's East Asia Summit (EAS) in Bali, Indonesia on
November 18-19 will welcome two new member states - the
United States and Russia [1]. The new members make this
annual grouping of odd-fitting dialogue partners an even
more complex body, while defying the geographic context of
its title.
The EAS has had extra-regional dimensions since its
inception in 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, when the presence of
Australia, New Zealand and India excited controversy from
different quarters. The hosts and chief initiators of the
whole project, Malaysia, objected the presence of two
Pacific states that were ethnically non-Asian and seen as
Western stooges, while China resisted the the inclusion of
India, as a South Asian state that could threaten its
predominant position.
Among the non-East Asian powers that now command seats at
the EAS, India faces perhaps the greatest challenges in
justifying its influence over the region's diplomatic
agenda. Coverage in Indian media in the run up to Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh's Bali voyage has focussed largely
on a bilateral pow-wow he is scheduled to have with US
President Barack Obama on the summit's side-lines. Hardly
anything of import about India's capacity to become a major
East Asian player has come to light, reflecting a large gap
between aspirations and reality.
India's strategic elites want to shape their country into a
countervailing force in China's strategic surroundings,
possibly replacing the US in the long run should Washington
lose the fiscal strength needed to project power in East
Asia. Since China's military and economic penetration of
South Asia, India's "near abroad", is quite advanced, New
Delhi seeks tit-for-tat pressure points in Southeast and
Northeast Asia to remind Beijing that hegemony in Asia will
not be conceded without contest.
The political dimensions of India's two-decade-long "Look
East" policy underscore this willingness to enter a zone
that China has lorded over since Japan's decline, with hopes
New Delhi will be entrenched as a "resident power" like the
US. However, unlike Washington, New Delhi faces a serious
paucity of material means to fuel its dreams of becoming a
pivotal actor in the Southeast and Northeast Asian regions.
Indian naval strategists warned earlier this year against
bravado in the disputed South China Sea waters, following a
spat with China over oil exploration by an Indian
state-owned oil company off the coast of Vietnam. Admiral
Arun Prakash, a retired chief of India's navy, cautioned
against conflict with China over "freedom of navigation in
international waters" at a time when the Indian navy was
thinly stretched and lacked the means to "sustain a naval
presence some 2,500 nautical miles (4,630 kilometers) from
home to bolster ONGC Videsh Ltd's stake in South China Sea
hydrocarbons".
In an inversion of former US president Theodore Roosevelt's
maxim of "speak softly and carry a big stick", Indian
officials have been unable to seamlessly integrate
diplomatic exchanges with China-fearing countries in
Southeast Asia like Vietnam and the Philippines into
concrete naval expansion.
Unlike the US, India lacks the naval bases or warships that
could deter the formidable People's Liberation Army Navy in
Southeast and Northeast Asia.
China, which usually dismisses India's pretensions as an
Asian superpower over its internal weaknesses, has not
however been complacent about multilateral military
exercises involving India, the US, Japan and Australia in
waters Beijing claims. But bowing to the fait accompli
presented by its relatively weak navy, New Delhi has in the
past limited these exercises to avoid riling China.
The Chinese position that foreign navies should not be
"intruding" on vast oceanic areas far beyond the concept of
territorial waters and exclusive economic zones is arguably
the central security issue of the EAS. Despite its soaring
ambitions, India is at best a bit player on this point and
will remain so as long as its navy is not a global force.
In the economic sphere, India's free-trade agreement (FTA)
with the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) does lend New Delhi an undeniable importance at the
EAS. While this pact much smaller in the volume of exchanged
goods than China's FTA with ASEAN, the mere availability of
another gigantic market of a billion-plus consumers in the
vicinity of China is a welcome development for smaller
nations in the EAS that fear damage to local producers at
the hands of China's predatory exports.
However, one of the deficiencies in India's "Look East"
economic policies is that its gaze has not reached far
enough east. Indians are more familiar with plotting a role
in Southeast Asia than farther afield in Northeast Asia. The
latter is witnessing remarkable moves towards closer
economic integration, a process in which India is currently
a non-entity.
In spite of their historic and strategic divides, China,
South Korea and Japan have deepened a series of currency
swap agreements put in place since the global financial
crisis of 2008 to absorb sudden shocks. As export-dependent
economies, the three Northeast Asian powers are closely
enmeshing their financial sectors, generating a new dynamic
of pro-China domestic constituencies that rival the older
pro-American lobbies in Tokyo and Seoul.
India's challenge as a rising economic power is to find ways
to cultivate pro-India forces in East Asia through concrete
trading and financial tools. Unless the Indian economy
develops a significant manufacturing and exporting segment,
New Delhi will find itself locked out of the innovative
economic regionalism that China is spearheading in its
neighborhood. It is China's prowess in exports that has
enabled it to now prepare a yuan trade settlement agreement
with the 10-member ASEAN group, boosting the yuan's status
as a regional reserve currency in Asia.
At the Bali summit this weekend, Manmohan will make all the
ceremonial statements and satiate the press corps back home
with photo-ops with Obama. However, the crux of the matter
is the reality that India is still not a central actor in
the East Asian theater. New Delhi will need to orchestrate
multiple structural transformations of its naval priorities
and economic thrust before it can claim to be a genuine
match to China and a tiger with teeth in East Asia.
Notes:
1.) The 18 countries attending this year's East Asia Summit
are: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines,
Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, United States, and
Vietnam.
Sreeram Chaulia is a professor and Vice Dean at
the Jindal School of International Affairs in Sonipat,
India, and the first ever B. Raman Fellow for Geopolitical
Analysis at the strategic affairs think tank, the
Takshashila Institution. He is the author of the recent
book,
International Organizations and Civilian Protection: Power,
Ideas and Humanitarian Aid in Conflict Zones (I.B.
Tauris, London).
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights
reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and
republishing.) |
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