BOOK
REVIEW
Demilitarize or perish Rethinking the National Security of
Pakistan by Ahmad Faruqui
Reviewed by Chanakya Sen
Always trust an economist to prick balloons of
national security floated by militarists.
Economic consultant Ahmad Faruqui's commentary
on demilitarizing Pakistan offers an
alternative vision for priming human
development, the road that rulers in Islamabad
never took. Published when generals are yet
again preferred instruments of Western
intervention in Pakistan, this book warns of
dire consequences if new paths are not hewn.
A Faustian bargain
Faruqui's central thesis is that most of
Pakistan's socio-economic problems originate
from the heavy emphasis on national defense
and military spending. Pakistan's
unconditional
support for the US's "war against
terrorism" after September 11, 2001 has
augmented this lopsided stress. President
General Pervez Musharraf has been handed
"an enduring rationale for continuing as
president under Kelsen's law of necessity that
has served all prior military rulers". (p
xix). He is less inclined to take any major
initiatives to pursue peace with India.
Military expenditure continues to absorb the
lion's share of the government budget and no
major overhaul of Pakistan's military
organization is likely. The endemic problem of
military dominance in Pakistan has been
perpetuated with the mutual embrace of the
West and Musharraf.
More harm than good has accrued when Musharraf
short-sold Pakistan to the US. To prevent the
"Islamic bomb" from falling into
religious terrorist hands, the American 15th
Marine Expeditionary unit is ready to
"neutralize" Pakistan's weapons of
mass destruction even at the cost of engaging
Pakistani troops. The arrest of Pakistani
nuclear scientists for passing know-how to al-Qaeda
was done to please the US Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Changes in the Pakistan army
high command and the Inter-Services
Intelligence were carried out to curry favor
with the Central Intelligence Agency. India
has succeeded in throwing flashlights on
terrorist training infrastructure in Pakistani
Kashmir. The victory of the Northern Alliance
in Afghanistan is a major setback to Pakistan
due to the former's closeness to Iran and
India. Pakistan's economy is deteriorating,
with sliding per capita incomes lower than 1%,
and foreign economic assistance evaporating
after the Taliban were dislodged from
Afghanistan.
Musharraf's decision to ally with the US turns
out to be a Faustian bargain, not a bright
tactical move. It is similar to the 1999
Kargil war with India planned by Musharraf.
Initially praised as "an act of military
brilliance", Pakistan lost both the
political and military battle for Kargil. It
had to withdraw in humiliating circumstances
since "the world chose to accept the
Indian version of events". (p 16)
History of militarism
Pakistan's governance travails stem from
dictators who are "specialists in
violence rather than in economics". (p
19) Small cabals have acquired
disproportionate organizational and collusive
power under successive military regimes. The
landed oligarchy, the bureaucracy and the
jihadis are the main beneficiaries of
Pakistan's "political economy of
defense". (Ayesha Jalal) Their fortunes
have been peaking through policies
exacerbating inter-class and inter-regional
inequalities.
General Ayub Khan nurtured a class of robber
barons with gigantic concentration of wealth
in a handful of families. West Pakistan's per
capita income was 61% higher than the East's
under Ayub. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a feudal lord
himself, was unable to rise above his roots.
He transferred resources from public
enterprises to private individuals and income
distribution worsened under his so-called
socialist tenure. General Zia ul-Haq
mass-appointed retired and serving army
officers to top public sector positions and
allowed one fifth of the US$3.2 billion
American aid for Afghanistan to be pocketed by
the military-civil service elites. Benazir
Bhutto doled out franchises to thugs and
convicted murderers and triggered a new arms
race with India due to her respect for the
Pakistani military's "autonomy".
Nawaz Sharif, Zia's protege, misused public
funds for favoritism and kickbacks and
followed his mentor's promotion of orthodox
militancy.
Musharraf's coup in 1999 occurred when
"the army's corporate interests were
threatened". (p 35) He has named manifold
ex-generals as diplomats and many
senior-serving officers to civilian duties for
which they have no core competency. He has not
touched the lucrative contracts and sinecures
of the defense coteries and has failed to rein
in religious militias waging jihad.
Misreading India
Pakistan's present and past national security
strategies are premised on fear of being
reabsorbed into India. The Pakistan army has
convinced many citizens that India never
reconciled itself to the partition of 1947. To
counter this perceived Indian threat
militarily, "no economic sacrifice is
judged to be too much". (p 42) Pakistan's
claim to Kashmir is the main legitimating
potion of its ruling class and the hawks in
its security establishment. This obsession has
misbegotten four costly wars and countless
acts of subversion that proved fruitless.
Pakistan's military planners have projected
India as "a pushover adversary that is
cowardly because the Hindu has no stomach for
a fight". (p 44) They have raised very
high expectations about the superiority of
Pakistan's armed forces, illusions repeatedly
shattered by defeats. In spite of enjoying
tactical successes, Pakistan has consistently
failed to achieve strategic objectives in wars
with India. Often, Islamabad has
"completely misunderstood Indian
intentions and capabilities" and jumped
the gun with hubris and folly. In 1971,
General Niazi believed that India would merely
conduct a minor incursion into East Pakistan
(to become Bangladesh) to set up a puppet
regime, though Indian responses to provocation
have always been aggressive, like those of
other states of similar power and size in the
international system.
Failures in the higher direction of war have
been matched by diplomatic fiascos and
leadership blunders. Pakistan expects its
foreign allies to bail it out of difficult
situations against India, but these hopes have
rarely materialized. In the Kargil war, China,
the vaunted "perpetual ally", did
not support Islamabad owing to fear of Islamic
extremism. Counting on China as a
counterweight to India is also chimerical
because "the Indians have made it plain
that they will not be routed a second time and
intend to return any Chinese 'lesson' in
kind". (p 90)
Nuclear fallacies
Pakistan's advocacy of nuclear deterrence is
meaningless since it has not capped its
program after developing a few atomic bombs.
In the year following its nuclear tests of
1998, Pakistan had to increase defense
spending by 10%, nullifying the publicized
benefits of a "nuclear dividend".
Nothing changed in the day-to-day life of
common Pakistanis, even though nuclear
scientists and generals commercialized weapons
of mass destruction for personal gain.
Cash-strapped Pakistan is incapable of
matching the Indian increases in defense
budgets, but the vanity of weaponizing
"even if the people eat grass" (Z A
Bhutto) has not receded.
Pakistan's nuclear program cost an estimated
$10 billion up to 2001 and set back
development indices by more than years.
Post-nuclear US sanctions caused Pakistan's
economy to suffer a gross domestic product
fall of 2.9%. The exorbitant opportunity costs
of Pakistan's nuclear white elephant have
actually diminished the country's national
security.
Retrenchment strategies
The solution to Pakistan's security deficit
suggested by Faruqui is to balance its
economic resources with strategic ambitions.
What is needed is a "lean and mean
military organization, without becoming a
drain on the national treasury and undermining
the non-military dimensions of security".
(p 115) The comparative experience of Israel,
which depends on reservists for defending
territorial integrity, is a lesson. To defend
Pakistan against external aggression, a force
level of 300,000 troops is enough, ie half of
the present strength. Demobilization can be
carried out by offering golden handshakes and
compensation packages for converting swords
into ploughshares. Small force levels do not
imply weak defense.
At present, Pakistan is incurring a price tag
of $110 million a year for pumping the
insurgency in Indian Kashmir and thereby
earning the ire of the international
community. Faruqui prescribes a more active
"third party catalyst" role for the
US to provide incentives for peace over
Kashmir, though how a superpower interested in
running off democratic India against China can
be expected to be an honest broker over
Kashmir is left for the reader's imagination.
Faruqui's reading of post-Cold War realities
and US-China equation are confusing.
Economic aid, debt write-offs and conversion
to zero-interest loans are also recommended to
encourage defense spending cuts in Pakistan
and India. Faruqui makes assumptions that
Indian security is purely Pakistan-centric by
adducing two-country game theory models to
prove that economic diplomacy works.
Bilateralizing concentric multilateral threat
perceptions is too simplistic.
Faruqui's proposals for reforming the
Pakistani military are on firmer ground. To
improve national security by lifting the
people's confidence in the military, the
latter should provide a transparent analysis
of its fiscal expenditures. Pakistan's defense
spending has been free from scrutiny or audit,
thanks to the guiding philosophy of
"defense for the sake of defense".
Only two lines in the official budget (defense
administration and defense services) represent
the huge military expense bill, with no
explanation of what these two items stand for.
Pakistan should switch from exorbitant
"offensive defense" to
"defensive dominance" strategies
that involve civilian participation. The
military must formalize rigorous
self-evaluation of combat effectiveness and be
willing to accept failings.
Do or die
Pakistan's poor economic situation is linked
intrinsically with faulty defense and foreign
policies. Faruqui offers Pakistani leaders the
example of Deng Xiaoping, who converted
China's foreign policy of confrontation into
one of economic cooperation. Pakistan's
savings and investment ratios are among the
lowest in the world, mainly due to defense
spending and corruption, both severe drains.
It spends 6% of its gross domestic product on
defense, while health and education stagnate
at 1% and 2%.
Faruqui argues for correct, accurate and
realistic threat evaluations, not exaggerated
and unrealistic ones. These would also bring
home the futility of massive arms importing
and free resources for public welfare.
Military spending in Asia as a whole has
declined from the end of the Cold War and
helped power investment and per capita incomes
in the long run. Disarmament is feasible and
practical, as examples from both developing
and developed countries reveal. For Pakistan,
which is on the edge of the precipice, there
is no choice but to pragmatically take a leaf
from Deng's famous dictum that strength is
primarily economic.
But for a disappointing reliance on
International Monetary Fund and World Bank
formulas for poverty alleviation, Faruqui's
study is a fine blend of strategic revision
and economic prognosis. The million-dollar
question is whether Musharraf reads this
honest reappraisal of what Pakistan requires
to be really secure.
Rethinking the National Security of
Pakistan. The Price of Strategic Myopia by
Ahmad Faruqui. Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot.
ISBN: 0-7546-1497-2. Price US$79.95,190 pages.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact [email protected]
for information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
support for the US's "war against
terrorism" after September 11, 2001 has
augmented this lopsided stress. President
General Pervez Musharraf has been handed
"an enduring rationale for continuing as
president under Kelsen's law of necessity that
has served all prior military rulers". (p
xix). He is less inclined to take any major
initiatives to pursue peace with India.
Military expenditure continues to absorb the
lion's share of the government budget and no
major overhaul of Pakistan's military
organization is likely. The endemic problem of
military dominance in Pakistan has been
perpetuated with the mutual embrace of the
West and Musharraf.
