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BOOK
REVIEW
Muslim democracy: An oxymoron?
Democracy in Muslim Societies by
Zoya Hasan (ed)
Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia
Whether Islam and democracy can coexist within the same
socio-political space has long been debated by lay persons
and academics. On one hand are defensive claims insisting
that Islam has all the value ingredients compatible with
democracy and that the religion has been "twisted" out of
context by a small minority of hotheads. This side believes
that there is nothing about Islam per se that inhibits
democracy from flowering and blames narrow cultural frames
for misstating the problem.
On the other hand are studies showing that, empirically,
Muslim countries have fared very poorly in terms of
democratic form or substance compared to non-Muslim
countries. This side argues that there is something in the
authority patterns of Muslim values that subverts genuine
democracy.
Since 70% of the world's Muslims live in non-Arab Asian
countries, evidence in this debate has to include them and
not just the homogeneous block of Arab states. Zoya Hasan's
new edited
volume containing six case studies posits that one must
grasp the varieties and multiple paths taken by Muslim
politics in the quest for democracy.
The editor's introductory essay asserts that a "shift from
Arab to Asian societies" as units of analysis is an
"intellectual move" challenging stereotypical discussions of
Muslim politics after the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks in the United States. The message is that the
political language of Islam is not uniform and one has to
delve into the national contexts and peculiarities of each
case. Hasan contends that Islam is in constant interaction
with its socio-economic and political environment,
especially its colonial heritage, state-society relations,
international setting and stage of development. Islam cannot
be the only factor of interest in assessing chances of
democracy because there are other variables that have a
bearing on the issue.
Amena Mohsin and Meghna Guhathakurta's chapter on Bangladesh
reflects on why the country has been steadily Islamizing in
violation of its original secular democratic aspirations.
The military-bureaucratic elites inherited notions of a
divine right to rule from the Pakistan era and, lacking
legitimacy, used Islam to shore up their rule. Under General
Zia ur-Rahman, the state identified itself with Islam and
persecuted Hindus, Ahmadiyas or Qadiyanis. It engineered
demographic shifts to dilute the ethnic composition of
minorities. Society was turned toward a "mosque-centric"
direction and politics became "street-centric" during
General H M Ershad's dictatorship. Despite 15 years of
formal democracy, the army remains unaccountable to the
public, who cannot freely criticize it due to constitutional
forbidding.
Even the liberal Awami League party uses religion in all its
activities and does not clearly advocate reinstituting
secularism in the constitution. Political leaders of all
spectrums oppose civil society activism in the name of
traditional religious values. The culture of intolerance,
hatred and violence of political parties goes hand in hand
with terrorist activities that have "intruded into the
popular psyche" since the mid-1990s. The state's total
failure to check terrorist threats to democracy is ascribed
by many to the fact that Bangladeshi rulers themselves
patronize Islamic fundamentalism. Politicization of the
bureaucracy and judiciary and the absence of internal
democracy within parties are other obstacles to democratic
practice.
Adriana Elisapeth narrates how Indonesia's moderate majority
are "powerless in preventing the growth of militant groups
committing violent actions against non-Muslims". (p 75)
Ironically, democratization in the post-Suharto era opened
the floodgates for expression of overtly religious
identities. Once competitive politics began after 1998, the
idea of an Islamic state under sharia law was revived by
extremists. Though the country is now under civilian rule,
"religious ideas could not strictly be separated from the
bases of state behavior". (p 93)
Thanks to authoritarian values of "blind obedience", it
remains impossible to force Indonesia's military out of
politics altogether. Islamist outfits like Laskar Jihad
receive financial support and ammunition from within the
army's ranks and from fellow jihadis in southern
Philippines. They force minorities to live in mortal fear
and are also responsible for enforcing severely gender
discriminatory laws of sharia. Low keenness of civilian
politicians in countering militant Islam is partly
responsible for turning the country into a "hotbed of
terrorism in Southeast Asia". (p 98)
Sadegh Zibakalam's chronicle of democracy in Iran documents
how the post-1979 Islamic Republic suppressed the democratic
elements of the struggle against the shah and made it appear
as if the revolution was intended to create an Islamic
state. Rivalries among different political factions and
Islamic strands led to purging of moderate and liberal
leaders from the revolutionary spectrum and their
replacement by fundamentalists. Critics of the current
dispensation in Tehran blame the constitution as a stumbling
block against any democratic improvement. Too much power
belongs to unelected institutions that veto progressive
legislation, disqualify electoral candidates for lacking
"appropriate Islamic credentials", and deliver religiously
biased justice. The author finds some solace in the degree
of freedom accorded to the press and relaxation of codes of
conduct to form associations and non-governmental
organizations.
Abdul Rahman Embong portrays Malaysia as a state that
"attempts to negotiate with Western modernity and redeem
Islam as a progressive religion". (p129) This most
industrially advanced Muslim country has maintained a
parliamentary democracy with tolerance toward minorities,
although Islam is the official religion. Reasonably free
elections have been held since 1959 and a grand "consociational"
alliance of parties provides stability.
The problem, which Embong brushes under the carpet, is
absence of turnover of governments, as the same ruling
alliance has been winning every single election. Should the
Islamist opposition ever triumph at the polls, a theocracy
could possibly be attempted. Authoritarian tactics like
crushing of dissent and suborning of the judiciary,
particularly during the reign of Mahathir Mohamad, also
place a question mark on the quality of Malaysia's
democracy. Provinces ruled by Islamists take strict measures
to curb "moral decadence" and government bureaucracies go
about enforcing the "official doctrine of Islam" and
prohibiting "deviationist activities". (p 159) Increasing
Islamization and proselytization backed by law are also
generating "scary" moments for non-Muslims.
Mohammad Waseem's enlightening chapter on Pakistan focuses
on deficits in the project of state building that created
imbalances in favor of the army and bureaucracy at the cost
of civil society and the legislature. The migrant Muslim
professional class, which was the backbone of the Pakistan
movement, had a "well-established 'statist' perspective of
paternalistic rule over an illiterate peasant society". (p
190) It captured the new state’s apparatus and
institutionalized strong centralist connotations of
governance.
Lacking a meaningful electoral constituency of their own,
state elites worked against the principle of majority rule.
The Pakistani army always favored presidentialism over
parliamentarism in order to keep the position of chief
executive safe from accountability and to ensure stable
tenure. It deliberately weakened political parties through
the device of "grassroots-level government". All along,
Pakistan's state elites tried to "manage ethnic politics
with the help of Islamic ideology", handing over formal or
informal dictatorial power over society to mullahs.
Waseem avers that the Islamist ascendancy, which has
currently peaked, "needs to be understood in the context of
an unstable regional setting, the civil-military crisis at
home and the ideological framework of politics in Pakistan".
(p 212) Strategic alliances of military dictators with the
US have perpetuated the undemocratic and terrorist currents
emanating from this country.
Korel Goymen's article on Turkey underlines the wholesale
borrowing of Western institutions and techniques after 1923
as crucial for the development of democracy. Overhauling the
clerical hierarchy and Shari’a law brought about a radical
change from a religious empire to a secular republic.
Mustafa Kemal's "cultural offensive" to secularize public
life set definitive limits on the political role that Islam
could play. However, traditional Islamic forces remained
alive and mobilized the suspicions and fears of the masses
against modernizing elites once the transition to a
multi-party system occurred after World War II.
The Turkish army appointed itself as the guardian of Kemal's
legacy and began acting as a bulwark against
religiously-inspired parties. Coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and
1997 were all targeted at manifestations of political Islam.
Elected governments led by conservative religious parties
are currently accepted by the military, but with
apprehensions. Urban and better educated Turks also remain
extremely nervous about the recent successes of political
Islam.
However, Turkish Islamists have operated within
secular-democratic channels and do not possess the extremist
gene found elsewhere. The present Islamic ruling party has
even passed legislation against discrimination of
homosexuals. Goymen attributes this exceptionalism to
historical sequencing. "Republican Turkey initiated and
consolidated its secular project before allowing Islam to
play a role in politics." (p 239)
Censorship of the media and military meddling to "correct"
politicians' mistakes are two outstanding bottlenecks that
the country still grapples with. Paradoxically, Goymen
remarks that "most citizens are comfortable with the
military's role as a guardian of democracy". (p 243) He also
mentions the European Union's accession "road maps" as
external stimulants for Turkey to deepen its democratic
potential.
A common theme emerging from this book is that Islam has
been manipulated by two types of actors - conservative
authoritarian rulers who need props for social acceptance,
and radical social activists who need a mobilizing creed
against dictatorship or central government oppression. Hasan
moots ijtihad (open interpretation of Islam) as the
mechanism behind this instrumental use of religion that
damages democracy.
Unfortunately, she does not comparatively examine non-Muslim
countries to see if religion has similarly been manipulated.
What explains the relative infrequency of religious
manipulation as a tool of regime legitimization or
de-legitimization in non-Muslim countries? Does it boil down
to whether a religion has institutions like ijtihad
or does it go deeper into the way different organized faiths
extract submission from believers?
Is it easier to mobilize the masses for revolution or to
consecrate a tyranny using Islam in a Muslim country than
using Buddhism in a Buddhist country, Hinduism in a Hindu
country, or Christianity in a Christian country? What is the
link between the method of struggle or legitimation chosen
by actors in a country and its dominant religion? Owing to
its dogmatic stress on non-cultural factors, the book fails
to probe these interesting puzzles.
Democracy in Muslim Societies. The Asian Experience by
Zoya Hasan (ed). Sage Publications, New Delhi, September
2007. ISBN: 9780761935667. Price: US$$49.95, 266 pages.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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republishing.)
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