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The
ever-changing faces of terror
By Sreeram Chaulia
NEW YORK - The recently expressed view of Nigel Inkster, the
former deputy chief of Britain's secret service (MI6), that
Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud is now the world's
"deadliest Islamist threat and public enemy number one"
reveals the puerility of the so-called "war on terror". As
it enters its seventh year, the massive American effort to
root out al-Qaeda and its allied organizations around the
world faces a credibility problem with few successes and
several mishaps.
On commencing his costly misadventures in 2001, US President
George W Bush confidentially delivered bad news to his
military generals that "this will be a long campaign". As
the vague and drifting campaign reached the limits of
temporal stretching with no end in sight, a psychological
strategy that found favor with the US and its allies was to
personalize and simplify the problem for the imagination of
skeptical publics.
If victory is redefined as eliminating individual
personalities rather than defeating a complex network or
ideology, the bitter pill of failure can not only be
sweetened but also showcased as a sweetmeat for citizens'
consumption. This carefully crafted ruse of selling defeat
as success begins with lionization of an al-Qaeda-affiliated
leader through relentless coverage of his dreaded activities
in the state-browbeaten media. The next step is to keep
releasing stories that a hunt is on for the high-value
target and that US/North Atlantic Treaty Organization
intelligence is closing in on the star figure.
Since warfare is mortiferous, the likelihood of an
operational commander being killed in combat is not
far-fetched. After months or years of media buildup about
the significance of a particular jihadi leader and the
extent of havoc he has caused, when the subject does meet
his maker, the event will be hailed by American
spokespersons as a major milestone and feather in the cap
for the "war on terror". The reality on the ground is likely
that a replacement for the slain leader has already slipped
into his new shoes, but Western media will be asked to raise
a toast and self-congratulations will resound in Washington
and London that they are one step closer to extinguishing
the Islamist threat.
Bin Laden was a relatively unknown commodity in the Western
world until the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, but
the profile upgrade he subsequently received generated
widespread astonishment at the evil he represented. By
painting him as the supreme patriarch of jihad incorporated,
the message was conveyed that nabbing or killing him would
be the finest moment that would mark the beginning of the
end, if not the end, of al-Qaeda. The frequency of "Osama
the phenomenon" stories gradually thinned in the news media
once the war-makers realized that he was proving impossible
to trace.
The focus then shifted to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the number two
of al-Qaeda, who was copiously written about as the real
power behind the throne. The Egyptian doctor was portrayed
as even more lethal than bin Laden because of his acumen in
managing actual terrorist missions. Some commentators went
to the extent of opining that bin Laden was a puppet figure
and that the "real brain" was Zawahiri. Speculation that US
raids may have killed or fatally wounded Zawahiri has been
appearing for many years now, only to be eventually
disconfirmed.
Every time there is a report that he was targeted with a
missile or an aerial bomb, Western publics are made to
visualize the desired eventuality and feel that the "war on
terror" is on track. If Zawahiri is truly terminated, there
would be a series of statements and press releases from the
US and its allies to the effect that "we are winning and
here is the proof",
In 2004 and 2005, as the quagmire of Iraq deepened, the
personality of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was ratcheted up in
Western governmental and media outlets as the biggest
threat. Gory details of the Jordanian's massacres and
cruelty were discussed with awe and biliousness. Depicted as
a "terror mastermind" and "target number one", few were
aware that Zarqawi was not an organic member of al-Qaeda and
even opposed al-Qaeda's aims of unifying Sunni and Shi'ite
terrorists under a single Islamist banner.
Zarqawi's assassination in June 2006 was reported with
relief and glee as President George W Bush claimed that his
troops had "delivered justice to the most wanted terrorist".
It was another public relations blitz that made the war look
less of an unmitigated disaster and more of a mixed outcome
with reasons to smile.
Abu Laith al-Libi and Baitullah Mehsud are the latest
terrorist leaders to receive excessive biographical
attention and price tags on their heads. The former's death
in January was applauded as a "major blow" to al-Qaeda, even
though neutral sources were warning that the network is
going from strength to strength. If and when Mehsud is
obituarized, it will be the same shebang all over that
al-Qaeda is losing its top guns one by one and that the war
is being won.
For those who see through the game, it is obvious that the
personalization trick covers up huge foreign policy fiascoes
hatched by Washington and London. Fewer and fewer people are
willing to buy the comic book super villain version of the
"war on terror". The typical cowboy folklore of chasing down
the "bad guys" and ending up winner on a happy note has
taken a beating.
Sreeram Chaulia is an analyst of international
affairs at the Maxwell School of Citizenship, Syracuse, New
York.
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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