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Embattled
frontier
Lost Opportunities. 50 Years of Insurgency in the
North-East and India's Response by S P Sinha
Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia
A good 60 years after independence, India's politicians have
failed to satisfy the aspirations of its ethnically distinct
northeastern region. Policymakers in Delhi agonize over the
incessant insurgencies on this embattled frontier, where 99%
of the external boundary synchronizes with India's
international border. Counter-productively, alienation and
rebellion in this strategic area are exacerbated by bias and
insensitivity of agents of the Indian government. Divisive
strategies of political parties and an entrenched nexus
among politicians, bureaucrats and contractors contribute to
the mess.
In Lost Opportunities, S P Sinha, a scholar from the
Indian army, presents a one-stop compilation of the
insurrections in all the northeast "Seven Sister" states.
His core argument is that events beyond India's borders,
rather than ethnic impulses, are more potent influences on
the area's fate. He highlights the multiple linkages between
insurgencies on both sides of the India- Myanmar
border, where a "Christian cordon" exists among the Nagas,
Mizos, Kachins and Chins. However, overlooking the
pernicious involvement of the Myanmar military junta in drug
trafficking and guerrilla-fanning, the author clings to the
illusion that it is "practical" for Delhi to cooperate with
Myanmar.
The Chittagong Hill Tracts of erstwhile East Pakistan and
current-day Bangladesh have hosted nearly all the insurgent
groups of India's northeast. The rise of Islamist terrorism
in Assam and Tripura is a direct consequence of massive
illegal immigration from Bangladesh into these states. As of
1996, some 15 million illegal Bangladeshi immigrants had
infiltrated into India, with upwards of 4 million settling
in Assam and 1 million in Tripura.
Sinha pinpoints the changing demographic profile of the area
as the "heart of the problem". (p 27) Since 1937, the Muslim
League ministry of Mohammad Saadulla encouraged migration of
Bengali Muslims into Assam with the aim of claiming it as a
part of the hoped-for Pakistan. After India's independence,
the malaise was allowed to fester due to "misplaced ideas of
secularism and vote bank politics". (p 31) The prophecy of
former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger that
"Bangladesh would over the years accentuate India's
centrifugal tendencies and carve out new Muslim states" is
an ever-creeping reality.
When the British quit India in 1947, extremist Naga leader A
Z Phizo voiced demands for separation. As secessionists went
on the rampage in the 1950s, pro-India moderates like A K
Sakhrie were tortured and murdered by the militants. Coerced
taxation, forcible recruitment of cadres, and arms
procurement from East Pakistan were part of the mix. The
hostile conduct of Michael Scott, a British missionary close
to the rebels, undid chances of any negotiated settlement.
The spread of Christianity accentuated the Nagas' sense of
separateness. Across the northeast, missionaries "widened
the barrier and conflict between the hills and the plains".
(p 229)
From 1967 to 1974, Naga youths picked for guerrilla training
trekked to China, which even opened a school for
northeastern insurgents in East Pakistan. The 1975 Shillong
Accord, which promised peace, was rejected by some rebel
factions under Chinese sway. Splits and internecine feuds
between the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN)
and the Naga National Council played havoc with the lives of
innocent civilians. A ceasefire has held since 1997, but
killings and extortion by the underground go on. NSCN's
revival of the Chinese connection and the visit of its top
guns to Pakistan in 2000 raise doubts about any final
settlement.
Most Mizos did not press for separation from India in 1947.
Unlike Nagaland, the Church in Mizo areas opposed secession
and violence from the beginning. Perceived discrimination by
the central government during the 1959 famine triggered
militancy by the Mizo National Front (MNF), which was
welcomed in East Pakistan. Pakistan's defeat in the 1971 war
with India deprived MNF of a reliable ally, but it regrouped
with Chinese aid and Burmese havens. Factionalism in the MNF
weaned away splinters to join the Indian "mainstream". The
MNF supremo threw in the towel on being co-opted as Chief
Minister of Mizoram in 1987. Peace lasts in this state owing
to the presence of "an influential political class favoring
autonomy within India". (p 101)
In Manipur, the genesis of insurgency lay in discontent that
the majority Meiteis and their language were neglected by
Delhi in its bid to woo Naga militants. Once Pakistan's
assistance dried up after 1971, a China-trained People's
Liberation Army (PLA) unit was formed to perform urban
terrorist acts. In the 1990s, the PLA forged links with the
armies of Pakistan and Bangladesh. In this decade, the
distinction between above ground and underground politics
blurred. Clashes between Nagas and Kukis, the two minority
tribes of Manipur, were possibly instigated by Indian
intelligence agencies and bankrolled by Manipuri
politicians. Violent demonstrations by Meiteis against
bifurcating Manipur to meet the NSCN's demands are now
adding to the fracas.
In Tripura, the large influx of refugees from East Pakistan
and the unlawful transfer of tribal lands incited
anti-Bengali militancy. Sporadic riots against Bengalis
resuscitated insurgency from time to time. Bangladesh
succored the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) through the
MNF, but it later backed off, fearing Indian reprisals in
the form of support for Chakma militants. Breakaway cliques
of TNV rebels that enjoyed the patronage of Tripura's
political parties and operated through the porous border
with Bangladesh robbed the 1988 accord of its peace
dividend.
In Assam, feelings of the evil step-mother-like treatment by
the central government in economic development, along with
the dismemberment of the state in 1972, built up a reservoir
of resentment. Capitalizing on anti-immigrant sentiment, the
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) arose in the
mid-1980s with the support of the then-Assam state
government. Bodo tribals seeking a new state out of Assam
(within the Indian republic) took to insurgency in 1988,
allegedly with the blessings of Indian intelligence, to
counter ULFA. Sinha considers training camps in Bangladesh
and espionage work for Pakistan to be the two lifelines of
ULFA. Myopically, he avoids mentioning the complicity of the
Myanmar junta as the third buoy.
Riding piggyback on the flood of Bangladeshi immigrants,
numerous jihadi outfits have cropped up in Assam with the
goal of creating "Greater Bangladesh". They might replace
ethnic militant movements like those of Kamtapur and
Karbi-Dimasa as the locus of future insurgency. Sinha
believes that ULFA's ongoing purge of non-Assamese Indians
is a stratagem to dig out "working space for Bangladeshi
Muslims". (p 308)
Taking the cue from Assam, Meghalaya underwent a number of
violent riots since 1979 against non-tribal Indians,
Bangladeshis and Nepalese. Leveraging the high rates of
unemployment and drug addiction in the state, ULFA has
spawned front organizations such as the Achik National
Volunteer Council to facilitate safe passage for its cadres
to and from Bangladesh.
Thanks to the foresight of consultants like Verrier Elwin,
Arunachal Pradesh avoided the trademark violence. However,
the settlement of Chakma refugees from East Pakistan sparked
worries and spawned fledgling militant groups like United
Liberation Army of Arunachal.
Trade in illicit narcotics keeps many northeast insurgencies
going. Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram, which share a common
border with Burma, together account for the smuggling of an
estimated 20 kilograms of heroin daily. Naga and Manipuri
underground organizations derive a major portion of their
revenues from drug trafficking. The NSCN is known to collect
20% tariffs on the value of drugs passing through its
territory. It is also the lynchpin of gunrunning in the
northeast to Southeast Asia's clandestine arms market.
India's counter-insurgency strategy in the troubled region
graduated from military solutions to "winning the hearts and
minds" of disaffected tribes. To isolate rebels in Nagaland
and Mizoram, the Indian army grouped villages that caused
hardship for civilians. Policies like "area domination",
cordon-and-search and curfew along the international border
could not be avoided even though they restricted the freedom
of communities.
To the Indian army's credit, '"civic action" (social
welfare) that touched people's lives at the grassroots was
implemented in letter and spirit. The spoilers are
politicians and bureaucrats who are suspicious of any
enhancement of the army's public image as an instrument of
social and economic change. Poor relations between the army
and local police also hamper intelligence gathering.
As part of psychological operations, the Indian army
disseminates pamphlets detailing the amoral life and
debauchery of rebel leaders. Wherever possible, it erects
armed militia units called "village guards" to take on the
despised rebels. In Sinha's opinion, the security forces
still lack tactical doctrines to confront insurgents in
crowded urban centers.
To breathe easier in the northeast, India has to ensure more
efficient administrators, infuse employment-generating
investment, and curb illegal immigration. Sinha advocates
improved relations with Bangladesh and Myanmar, but omits a
deeper examination of regime shenanigans of these two
countries. To save the northeast, India needs to be sterner
with fundamentalist regimes in Dhaka and militarist regimes
in Naypyidaw.
Lost Opportunities. 50 Years of Insurgency in the
North-East and India's Responseby SP Sinha. Lancer
Publishers, New Delhi, 2007. ISBN: 81-7062-162-3. Price: US$
24. 357 pages
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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