Nuclear Safety and Theft: Skeletons in
Pakistan’s Cupboard
by Sreeram Chaulia
Forebodings about the lack of safety and theft of weapons of mass
destruction in the world’s newest nuclear state, Pakistan, have been
incrementally rising since the September 11th terrorist attacks on
America, generating nightmarish scenarios of mushroom clouds
enveloping volatile and heavily populated South Asia and of satanic
non-state actors gaining access to implements of annihilation for
killing and crippling thousands of humans with devastating
efficiency. The actions, assurances and explanations General Pervez
Musharraf’s government has tendered to assuage the world’s anxieties
in this regard have fallen short of certifiable guarantees. Not a
day passes without new reports and analyses warning that the worst
imagined apocalyptic fears of nuclear terrorism could materialize
and that Albert Einstein’s "fourth world war fought with sticks and
stones" may not be a far-fetched oracle after all.
Safety of Pakistan’s nuclear explosives, fissile material and
installations haunts many analysts and practitioners due to the
widespread domestic unpopularity and unrest created by the military
regime’s decision to support the war against terrorism in
Afghanistan. The most common alarm among many US officials pertains
to the possibility that the secrecy of location and storage of
Pakistan’s so-called "strategic assets" could be compromised if
there was an internal coup by Taliban sympathizers, ‘rogue elements’
of the military and the intelligence services, in a country whose
history is replete with army overthrows of existing set-ups. This is
a valid concern because of the emotional attachment religious
fundamentalists of Pakistan entertain towards possession and
deployment of the only ‘Islamic Bomb’ on earth. In response,
Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi asserted on September 23rd that Pakistan
had placed "multi-layered custodial controls with very clear command
structure" on its nuclear program and that panic whistles were being
"overblown". A good month and a half later, however, came
revelations in the Washington Post that Musharraf ordered an
emergency redeployment of the country’s nuclear arsenal, missiles
and aircraft to at least six secret new locations to prevent them
from falling into irresponsible hands.
In early October, Pakistan’s chief spy General Mahmoud Ahmed was
sacked owing to alleged links with Mohammed Atta, mastermind of the
September 11th attacks, and the very same pro-Taliban elements that
were aiming to capture the nuclear arsenal. Once again, the act was
officially described as a "routine reshuffle" that had nothing to do
with the impending campaign in Afghanistan or with nuclear safety.
Since there is complete porosity and camaraderie of service between
the army and ISI in Pakistan unlike other countries where
intelligence and military are often at loggerheads, and since the
ISI chief knows the ins and outs of nuclear installations, one is
left to wonder how much of the nuclear factor weighed in axing Ahmed
and how many more Ahmeds are presently occupying ISI desks with
knowledge of nuclear secrets.
Theft or clandestine transfer of Pakistani nuclear weapons to
terrorist outfits came one step nearer to reality when Osama bin
Laden recently admitted to journalist Hamid Mir that Al Qaeda had
acquired the capability as a ‘deterrent’ and when the IAEA conceded
subsequently in the New York Times that with more than 400 cases of
recorded fissile material smuggling in the last decade, renegade
groups could assemble a ‘dirty bomb.’ Islamabad reflexively denied
any leakage of nuclear raw material from its reservoir and the world
began turning pages of the familiar script of ‘loose nukes’ in the
former Soviet Union making their way into the sinister embrace of
jihad. But mysteriously enough on October 23rd, Pakistani
authorities arrested three top nuclear scientists with open Al Qaeda
sympathies for ‘enquiry’ and kept releasing and re-arresting them
until November 22nd when they were totally exonerated from all
charges.
There was a catch in this hush-hush enquiry too. Islamabad admitted
that two of them had visited Afghanistan regularly and "met Bin
Laden at least twice during visits to Kandahar in connection with
the construction of a flour mill." What professional scientists of
atomic fission and ace terrorist of the world were doing in a flour
mill is anyone’s guess, but the Musharraf government is now issuing
predictable ‘clarifications’ that the physicists’ visits did not
lead to any transfer of dual-use technology or material. Why did it
take so agonizingly long and so many sessions of interrogation for
this clean chit? It is a matter worth pondering over and asking
Pervez Musharraf.
Pakistan’s unconvincing record and demeanor on the twin aspects of
nuclear safety and theft, coupled with the never-to-be discounted
probability of the downfall of Musharraf, have prompted the Bush
administration to maintain an "active review" of its nuclear
program. The country’s leading daily, Dawn, quoted on October 6th an
official in Washington saying, "We’re studying it. We’ve not made
any particular proposal. We haven’t seen any need to make any
proposal at this time." In light of latest developments like Mullah
Omar’s threat of unleashing a "big plan to destroy America", Bin
Laden’s chilling interview and the uncovering of covert lives of top
Pakistani nuclear scientists, it may not be too early for the
‘proposal’ to be made by Washington.
Ideally, it should be a swift pre-emptive seizure of Pakistan’s
tenuously guarded "strategic assets" and minimally, it should
comprise a thoroughly international and impartial investigation of
all the hanky-panky happenings listed above as well as verification
of the reliability of that country’s C-3 (command, control and
communication) triad. The future of humanity hangs by slender
threads of cast-iron nuclear safety and policing. When nations
owning arsenals eschew responsibility for maintenance, accidents and
fall-outs, it becomes the moral and legal right of the international
community to un-proliferate them.
Sriram Chaulia studied History at St. Stephen’s College, Delhi, and
took a Second BA in Modern History at University College, Oxford. He
researched the BJP’s foreign policy at the London School of
Economics and is currently analyzing the impact of conflict on
Afghan refugees at the Maxwell School of Citizenship, Syracuse, NY.
Perspectives on Terrorist Attacks |