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Are Personalities Passé?
One of the quandaries nagging
our globalising world, where identities are in churning, is that of the
missing heroine and hero. As is the wont of every generation that suffers
the inadequacies of its time and yearns for those ‘good old days’ when
ancestors strode the planet like colossuses, we too have felt an acute
vacuum in public life due to the passage of charismatic individuals.
Nostalgia for bygone personalities is at once damnatory of our present
wretchedness and celebratory of people who probably did less to deserve
all the accolades. Death beatifies even the mediocre, forgiving the
shenanigans and spotlighting the virtues. Some unfortunates have suffered
the reverse fate after being interred- slandered and misinterpreted for
partisan ends. Controversy never left Diana, Princess of Wales, alone, not
even in the dust into which she returned.
Biography’s Biography
To begin with, preoccupation
with biography and with individualism need not be confused as one and the
same. The role of individual personality in causation has been one of the
most fundamentally relevant discussions to all genres of historians, who
like varying streams merging into the ocean, hold different outlooks but
are uppermost concerned with the driving force behind all that happens.
Whether one is a biographer, Marxist or structuralist, the quest for a
fountainhead is tangential. Burdened with the onerous obligation of
affixing responsibility on someone or something for every event and trend,
they all strive to answer the seminal ‘why’ of history by examining the
role of the individual. A biographer may be assumed to strongly believe in
individualism, but the exceptions are also attracted to the individual,
Ian Kershaw to cite a thriving example. A structuralist historian such as
him taking to writing on personality is a reflection of the importance
attached by all schools to the personality factor2.
More will be dwelt on the utility value of personality study while
examining the pros and cons of prosopography.
“History”, to Carlyle, “is the
biography of great persons”[1].
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the tag of greatness, human being
beings have forever comprised the core of history. It is ‘his-story’, one
whose subject matter is concerned with generations of mortals who have
inhabited the earth since evolution. Literally speaking, economics and
politics, structures and patterns, rises and falls of even modes of
production, are all peopled and engage our attention only because they had
an impact on animate creatures. If individualism had been a benign
doctrine vindicating the centrality of the human being a la the
humanism of the Renaissance, no polemic would have been warranted. But the
fact that it has been understood as a philosophy denoting individual role
as a creative force in history has generated a fierce argument without
end. Supposing there were historians before Herodotus, when denizens or
actors could be counted on fingertips in an isolated habitation, they
would not have hesitated in ascribing responsibility for causation on one
person. But the modern annalist, accustomed to a world consciousness, has
a befuddling treasure of received tradition, documents and hearsay from
which to choose motivating factors. This weight of evidence has been
battened upon in our times with verbal aids of tape-recording, visual aids
of Tele-recording, Xerox and microfilm. The panoramic global coverage of
every aspect of life has given historians huge unexplored possibilities of
arriving at accuracy (besides entailing the warning of cautious selection
of data). With the scope of investigation having bloated to mammoth
proportions, a simplistic explanation for every new occurrence has been
progressively unacceptable and contentious. Certainly, the Balkanisation
of the erstwhile USSR had more than just to do with Gorbachev’s liberalism
or ineptitude. Macaulay echoes by observing that “in proportion as persons
know more, and think more, they look less at individuals and more at
classes”5.
It is in the light of such an ever-expanding societal context, a wider
angle both in absolute numbers and in mutual sophistication, that we take
up proceedings on the biographic approach. A brief chronological survey of
biography over the ages may serve as a good elucidation of the ‘march of
the mind’ (no Whig puns intended!).
Tracing the lineages of the
modern biography, one gets the impression that there has been an
accelerating trend towards recognition of the wider angle. From Plutarch’s
‘Lives of the noble Grecians and Roman human beings’ (1st
century B.C), which lacked awareness of being harbinger of a new faculty
of historiography, the laudatory Latin chronicles of the Middle Ages were
an advance both in form and content. They realised their own significance
in upholding status quo and launched the sub-sector of hagiography
or ‘official history’, a trend that survives to this day in the garb of
government-controlled publications and electronic media. In other
post-classical civilisations too, biography came to represent a useful
tool of establishments. ‘Harshacharita’, one of the best-known Sanskrit
eulogies of royalty, was composed by the court poet Banabhatta in 6th
century (AD) India. Propaganda lives reached a crescendo with the first
ever English biography, Thomas More’s ‘Richard III’ (1513). The
thoroughness of bibliographical attestation in More’s work was a clear
demonstration that the great individual’s story had come into its own.
A significant divergence that took biography along slivers owed to the European Renaissance and its absence in Asia. Reflecting an acute tilt, English biography pronounced that life in a human being itself was a worthwhile subject, not whether that individual was a celebrity or dominant. John Aubrey’s ‘Brief Lives’ (17th century) was a product of personal interviews of friends of the subjects, a collection of gossip and countless anecdotes which enabled vivid descriptions and character revealing details. Reasonably insignificant individuals sneaked into the work as protagonists, prompting Aubrey’s label of “first biographer of the under-privileged.” Roger North’s biographies of his own three brothers (18th century) displayed an even greater care for the little or potentially underrated. On the Asiatic theatre, however, panegyric was continued and perfected. Abul Fazl’s ‘Akbarnama’ remains unsurpassed to date in the history of world biography at lionisation and floridity of epithets. Following in his suit were myriad poet laureates of the Mughals who sang their masters’ praise almost to deification. Indeed, it is credit to the Renaissance that despite the prevalence of empires and court chroniclers. English and other European biographies turned to the human being shorn of halo.
The severe setback to 19th
century biography brings home the close relationship between the
biographer and his social milieu. When Plutarch wrote ‘Lives’, it was a
“good seed-time for biography”7,
with Pax Romana in full glory and a happy citizenry. Aubrey has been known
to reflect Renaissance virtues. The Victorian age with its peculiar
morality, however, proved a hindrance to 19th century
biography. The rise of the evangelical movement and its hold on emerging
middle classes could have had a major impact8,
although it is not apparent how the same rigid Protestantism did not
afflict biography in previous centuries. Due to the doctrine of salvation
and exclusiveness of those ‘saved’, no amusing, light or trivial reading
was permitted. Boswell himself, like Thomas Hardy, did not qualify for the
category of ‘serious reading’, an activity that had to have an elevating
impact on the mind. An ideal biographer became one whose heroes and
heroines could do no wrong. More than narration of the entire truth,
selection and ‘direction’ of the reading public were the order of the day.
Eulogy returned triumphantly to the centre-stage, so that Carlyle, the
arch idoliser himself lamented how “a Damocles’ sword of respectability
hangs over the poor English life-writer” of the period with the effect
that “there was no biography but some vague ghost of a biography”9.
Better placed to describe the ascent of concealment is Virginia Woolf:
“Noble, upright, chaste, severe; it is thus that the Victorian worthies
are presented to us”10.
Tolstoy’s magnum opus, ‘War and Peace’, with its belittling
of Napoleon can be viewed in one anagogue as a great response to the
tyranny of illustriousness his century witnessed. It is the survival of
such a larger than life characterisation in biography that we shall duly
condemn.
A violent reaction to the
century of moral straitjacketing began with the flamboyant Lytton Strachey,
whose ‘Eminent Victorians’ (1918) heralded the modern English biography, a
reaction that seems to be still reverberating. Again, for the tide to
turn, social moods were determinant. Disillusionment, irreverence and
iconoclasm were in the air of the 1920s. Strachey’s insistence on
emancipation from “funereal barbarism” of Victorian panegyric fitted well
into that spirit. His ‘New Biography’ concept brought back the human
being’s real nature and his place in society. The ‘Great Man’ syndrome was
broken once again to be followed by a ‘golden age of biography’ when many
fine biographies were written. It follows from our chronological survey
that good biography has prospered at an inverse proportion to
individualism, when our ‘wider angle’ put every character in broad
contexts. The initial distinction between preoccupation with individualism
and with biography thus stands upheld.
Owing conceivably to the
influence of Marxist thought and the farrago of post-modernism, academic
and intellectual circles since the last two decades consider life
histories as antediluvian. A new generation immersed in economic,
environmental and gender history has questioned the very basis of
character profile, in spite of its continued mass appeal. Never before has
biography as a form of writing been per se been cross-examined. The
‘boycott biography’ line having won over supremely skilled historians, it
is apposite to parrot J.E.Neale’s question: “Is biography facing a crisis
or has it become outdated?”11,
and does this imply whether majority historians deem the individual
achiever less important or that causation ahs changed hands from persons
to material conditions, economic undercurrents or atomic components that
make up society’s equilibrium? In other words, have certain societies
reached a mode of production that precludes individualism?
Marxist loathing of biography
stems from the assumption that individualism is an integral part and
parcel of exploitative modes of production like Capitalism. Just as feudal
ideologies stressed the worth of tradition, order and religion, “new
bourgeois ideology” stresses individual freedom and progress. James
Russell is emphatic that “in no previous form of society has the value of
individualism been so exalted”12.
Since market-economies thrive on mobility of all units of production,
including labour, the individual has fewer ties to family, community and
other groups that are normally binding. Two negative repercussions follow
therefrom: individualism becomes capital’s most powerful weapon of
ideological domination of labour, another opium of the masses; and by
embedding a culture of individualism in social life, abetment is given to
unfettered freedom and the rise of monsters capable of wreaking havoc.
On a more theoretical plane
about individual role, Plekhanov has argued that free individual will and
determinist inevitability are not incompatible but symbiotic13.
The consciousness of inexorable occurrences and historical necessity is
essential for persons to display their indomitable energy and perform the
most astonishing feats. Only when humans realise that they are “one of the
forces” that will lead to a preordained denouement can they be of any
significance in pushing time towards it. Absolute certitude in the
fatality and irrevocability of the unification of Germany were what made
Bismarck an energetic statesman as he himself claimed in 1869: “we cannot
make history; we must wait while it is being made”14.
Immutable laws carry a “hidden necessity” and would crystallise no matter
one given individual comprehends their power or not, for another would.
Even if an individual receives the consciousness and joins the bandwagon
of what ‘will be’, accident and personal qualities have a limited role in
affecting the final outcome since they merely fulfil the desired role
which is determined less by psyche and more by the internal structure of
society and the “character of social and economic relations”. This
position is summed up by declaring that “there is no gulf between the
subject and the object”, but the scope of action for the subject is
delimited by the material social circumstances “which are stronger than
the strongest individuals”15
and which will choose another subject if the first is not falling into
line with the order of things.
While rejecting the dualism between subject and object, however, the most apparent loophole in the Marxist rendering is to interpolate a new dualism, one E.H.Carr calls “false antithesis between society and the individual”16. In answering the question, which to accord first preference - society or the individual-, it sides with the former and is apprehensive of the latter breaking away from it under the influence of capitalist individualism. Group identities are feared drowned in the euphoria of self-seeking and the summum bonum lost. But just as we stated that a biographer or historian judges his characters according to the pulse of his time, individuals are engaged as social beings in a social process called history. Being born into society and reared by it from his earliest years, speaking the language it bequeaths and developing habits it localises, no individual, be it in capitalism or any other mode, can escape the imprints of his social ambience. If the rise of the modern world was accompanied by heightened accent on individual initiative, it had to nonetheless operate within new social orders. From the Renaissance down to the 19th century philosophy of Utilitarianism, there were specific stages in historical development represented by specific social processes, and not a blanket revolt of individuals against societal confines. Indeed, the foundation of both Marxist thought as well as intellectual individualists like Huxley, Sartre and Adorno lies in this imagined antipathy, albeit from opposite ends.
The Mighty Individual
Having amicably resolved the
fancied duel between individual and society, we face the problem of
Legends, Myths and heroes, great persons imposing themselves on history
and society by virtue of uniqueness or, to John Stuart Mill,
“rebelliousness”. If an individual is part of generic units, a “herd
animal” (Marx), then how are exemplars who allegedly ‘make history’ and
‘mould society’ to be accounted for? Hero-worship in English biography, as
we have recounted, found its acme in the 19th century. James
Clifford argues that Romanticism, as much as Evangelism, induced
accentuation on emotions and feelings as opposed to complete factual
truth. Sympathy was desired, not frankness, and with complete sympathy
came hero-worship, totally lacking any intention of calling projecting
reality. Our motive is not to return to biography’s past here, but to
suggest that Myth-making applies to particular historical contexts like
Europe in the 19th century. One has to see behind the curtain
of blind adulation and read the serviceability a society or section
derives from erecting gargantuan legends. After all, “Nations have lived
spiritually upon myths, legends and ‘vital lies’”17.
As a matter transcending literary, biographic and historiographical bounds
and as a tool of national consciousness, hero-worship deserves a separate
essay of its own, but the point here is that Myths are constructions
centred around an individual, constructions with self-purpose or a vested
interest which most often do injustice to the protagonist’s actuality.
Quite logically, Carlyle
belonged to the 19th century. At no other time would he have
found such a spellbound audience and at no other time could he have been
such a tremendous intellectual influence. Hagiography existed long before
and after Carlyle but to his credit goes the theorisation of individualism
as the most profitable means of following history, a notion that strikes
the critical mind as primitive for a plethora of reasons. Firstly, the
choice of heroes is admittedly conflicting, subjective and emotional. A
saintly demigod to the Indian masses, Gandhi, could be a stamp-less beggar
(“that half-naked fakir”) to an arch Colonialist like Churchill, who
himself is classified among democratic heroes of the last century.
Carlyle’s six ‘Representative Persons’ varied from those of Emerson,
although they were contemporaries and the latter was clearly swayed by the
Briton. The preference for Odin, a central Norse deity, was simply a
result of Carlyle’s knowledge of Scandinavian mythology. Though the idea
of idea of starting with ‘hero as God’ as the earliest form of
hero-worship is a worthy one, however nebulous the distinction between
history and mythology it suggests, the example does not seem to have been
received unanimously. For that matter, criteria on which one compiles a
dossier of Great Persons inflect. The Scottish historian’s ‘Lectures’ of
the 1830s and 1840s repeatedly harp on aspects like the subject’s
‘sincerity’, i.e. determination to accomplish his deeds at any cost;
ability to command the respect, obedience or belief of ‘lesser persons’;
and a rise from humble origins to fabulous achievements, i.e. a noble
upstart or parvenu (a quality particularly coincidental with Carlyle’s own
life-graph). Even under the unusual circumstance of these attributes being
conjointly accepted, paragons would be at odds for different biographers.
Ergo, the audience has to contend with subjectively coloured heroes
and anti-heroes traded against each other and vying to be the true or
agreed image of a particular person.
It is perhaps this potential
for subjectivity and bias that has led to Myth-making and heroism being
applied successfully in partisan functional contexts. A.L Guerard
succinctly parades the ‘Venguer incident’ of 1794, where a French ship is
supposed to have valiantly defied a powerful British fleet and gone down
to immortal death, singing the glories of the revolution18.
Even after much of the heroism of republican soldiers was later disproved
(1838), the Legend struck in the French pantheon and became part of
“patriotic truth”. Greatness of persons is often tailored to the ideals of
a period, a contention further corroborated by the gross misrepresentation
in the 19th century America of Andrew Jackson as a “frontier
farmer”19.
We now know that the General-President belonged to the rentier class and
his relation to nature was concocted to satisfy American psyche violently
opposed to industrialised and refined Europe. A symbol oftentimes happens
to be reified by society as it deems one ‘ought’ to be rather than what
one ‘was’. Since the symbolic Andrew Jackson was a creation of the early
19th century, an a priori tautological conclusion must
be that an age does not belong to an individual but rather the vice-versa.
Walter Lippmann, America’s greatest journalist-intellectual, was so
thrilled by the magnetism of Theodore Roosevelt, de Gaulle and Nehru that
he exulted, “It’s as if the country is inside of them, and not they as
someone operating within the country.”20
The dangerous liaison between
nationalism and saga creation has near contemporary instances too.
Immediately after India attained freedom, a flurry of state-encouraged
nationalist historiography entered the educational curricula, exalting
Congress leaders to a pitch only the ambience could absorb, and painting
Jinnah and the Muslim League in a villainous and pathetic frame. Issued in
an air of idealism and nation building, it went on to be a psychological
weapon for one-party electoral dominance for nearly four decades. If
colonialist historiography was an Orientalist fabrication, nationalist
writings went about correcting the imbalance with more inaccuracies.
History and Myth, bifurcated by facts, intermeshed thanks to
scissors-and-paste methods. Rewards were reaped by vested interests in the
process-Congress party in India and theocratic politicians in Pakistan,
who somersaulted the Congress version and blamed Nehru, courtesy official
‘bards’ like I.H.Qureshi imputing that Nehru’s “mixture of cynicism,
wishful thinking and arrogance” caused the Partition of 194721.
Historiography is replete with such instances of vested interest groups
endowed with or seeking positions of power (Qureshi went on to occupy high
governmental office in Pakistan) carrying away the most blatant bluffs
without being called. Inasmuch as Myth-making is deplored and demolished
by academics on paper, the purposes it serves are thus lucrative enough to
make it inevitable. Having projected the impression that our own times are
critical of individual glorification, we cannot help noticing that in the
50th Anniversary celebrations of the People’s Republic of
China, Jiang Zemin’s cult of personality (following those of Mao and
Deng) was strikingly evident. The 1999 general election in the world’s
largest democracy, India, was fought almost entirely on the basis of a
personality factor in what is perceived as a ‘leadership dearth’ era.
Personality Cults
One of the most expedient political personality cults that helped an obscure First Secretary attain monumental power is that of Lenin’s, consciously deployed by Stalin on the way to his rise to dictatorship in the Soviet Union. This case is illustrative not only of the deviousness involved in terms of motives but also limpid demonstration of drifts from fact and validity which are inexcusable in history.
Three months after his death,
Stalin also made a bid for the role of Leninism’s official interpreter in
a lecture series, quoting eclectically from Lenin’s Selected Works.
Exhibiting casuistry, Lenin’s favourite theme of dictatorship of the
proletariat was claimed to be realisable only by “Soviet power as the
state form of the dictatorship of the proletariat”, one that “destroys
every kind of national oppression”25.
Following from this, the Party which represented Soviet power was
“incompatible with the existence of factions” and “precludes all
factionalism and division of authority”26.
While Lenin used the words “remove” for Reformists, Stalin was
nonchalantly laying down rules for “purging” opportunist elements. The
irony of the whole exercise is compounded not just in these distortions
but that self-professed Marxists (Trotsky also tried to appropriate the
Lenin heirdom in ‘On Lenin’, published in June 1924, highlighting inter
alia that he knew Lenin since 1902 unlike Stalin who putatively came
under the leader’s influence in 1903) who read and agreed with Plekhanov27
were indulging in Myth erection.
So far, we have treated
individual hero-worship as distortions of politicians and shortsighted
historians. But even idolisers have an excuse for apotheosis- their
subjects themselves propagated the idea that they were instruments of
providence and god's right-hand persons. Many Legends have, conceited
about their innate superiority to others, beaten their own trumpets.
Nietzsche's 'Superior Man' and Voltaire’s 'Genius' were, in the practical
world, those who successfully projected themselves in that aura to
posterity. Guerard's case study Legend of Napoleon, ever familiar to
Europeans, comes first in this category. Corsican General, First Consul,
Emperor and Prisoner were episodes that constituted the “historical
Napoleon”, but the 'man of destiny'- invulnerable, ubiquitous, omniscient
and titanic shape- ascending on the European horizon is a Myth that has
never been exorcised. Partly responsible for the proliferation of the
Bonaparte creed was the man himself, through what psychologists describe
as “ego defensive processes”. Individualism as extreme egoism was
identified by Saint Simonians in 19th century French political
thought and they needed not to look beyond Napoleon for substsantiation.28
There was “an element of conscious artistry in him”29,
an unconcealed endeavour to play to the gallery so that his fascination be
sealed for future ages. His official press, proclamations, bulletins and
memoirs can all be seen as propaganda on an imperial scale. The
'Memorial', rambling cogitation of a wounded pride in St.Helena, “was the
first and foremost source of what is called the Napoleonic legend”30.
A collection of randomly woven anecdotes and reminiscences, it advances
that before everything else Napoleon was the 'son of the revolution';
upholder of equality; and, quixotically, Promachos of national
self-determination in conquered territories. The glory of France, evident
in his rise and fall, naturally recurs in the work as a leitmotif, a
fortiori turning it into a popular classic. Charles de Gaulle was to
turn on the same style of patriarchal greatness in his autobiographical
works.
In ancient Indian history,
emperor Ashoka (3rd century B.C) who ostensibly adopted
Buddhism after being remorse-ridden by war and bloodshed is a favourite
figure for those who tend to stress India's peace-loving and accommodative
heritage. They do not think it synchronal that he left a myriad stone,
rock and pillar inscriptions by means of which his greatness came home
vis-à-vis other illustrious monarchs in an overall evidence-paucity
period. In the 19th century, influential English politician
Charles James Fox was keen to project an image of life-long devotion to
the ideals of Peace, Liberty and Reform, although his interpretation of
these concepts was highly coloured.31.
They went on to become legacies to the Whig tradition and depicted
prominently in the form of motifs associated with Fox sculptures in
Bedfordshire and 'Holland House'32,
later to greatly impact the 1832 Reform Act. Andrew Jackson was no less
guilty of painting himself as a rustic to win public support while he
stood for American presidency against a Harvard professor, John Quincy
Adams, in 1828. In self-reference, he was found using phrases like “farmer
soldier” and “plain cultivator of the soil”, and the already noted
symbolisation thereof. Plenty of modern versions of a corrupt undeserving
politician claiming to be a “humble farmer” exist in the third world (e.g.
H.D.Deve Gowda of India and Alberto Fujimori of Peru). Bismarck's
frustration after dismissal from Chancellorship in the 1890s was
channelised not only into scheming for his successor Caprivi's downfall
but also in allowing himself to be the hero and lodestone of a growing
radical-nationalist public. Bismarck’s own memoirs fostered the mystique
of the ‘strong man.’33One
is also reminded of other supreme stage-managers of the century that has
just elapsed- Fascist heroes Mussolini, Franco and Hitler (whose 'table
talk'34
can near Napoleon's 'Memorial' in self-vindication), Communist heroes
Stalin (the second Vozhd), Tito and Caucescu. Names and deeds of
this nature could be taken and recounted ad infinitum to prove that
aggrandisement and strutting advertisements are acts of willful artistry.
Freudian Take
If subjective qualities and a
doubtful principal presumption that the individual's actions always have a
strong impact on events due to a preponderance of his superhuman
attributes mar the mass of hero-worshipping biographies, psychoanalytical
studies of individuals are relatively more empirical and scientific. They
make a thorough attempt to penetrate the subject's mind-process or self
and can proffer thought-provoking rationale to his nature and actions.
Psychohistorians treat traits that every individual possesses as
derivatives of stable universal dispositions that could be gathered under
the much used and abused rubric of human nature. Following the Freudian
model, a series of identity and integrity crises at various stages of the
life span are uttilised to explain the protagonist's traits and
personality characteristics. The first crisis is one of early infancy,
where according to Erik Erikson, “a historical process is already at work”35
and often neglected by biographers. Depending on maternal and familial
care at this stage, “the human being's innermost mood will be determined
by basic trust or basic mistrust”36.
Martin Luther's mother, by inference, must have provided him a font of
basic trust from which he was able to draw his 'Primary Faith'. The second
crisis, that of infancy, develops the individual's will and decides
whether he is suited to be dominated by a sense of autonomy or by a sense
of doubt and shame. Luther, according to Erikson, and Gandhi, by
self-acknowledgepersonst36,
went opposite ways at this stage, the former violently doubtful of his
father's justification for weaning him away from a world of childish
trust, and the latter filled with “lingering feelings of shame”37
for precocious sins such as stealing and meat eating. The narrative line
of development trespasses two more stages in a bid to perceive “latent or
unconscious themes in the individual”38
and to account for previously inexplicable behaviour the average historian
is agnostic or negligent about (e.g. “painful, frightening, anxiety
inducing, disgusting or shameful feelings”39).
Aided by ancillary tools like Graphology, medical post-mortems, forensics,
'value-analysis'40
etc., progressive psychoanalytical histories have tried to maximise
objectivity while retaining the underlying emotional dynamics. Indeed,
with the exactness of medical science, the aim “to take account of every
aspect of a human being’s life, conscious or unconscious, psychic or
physical, public or private”41appears
nearer to hand.
However successful some psychohistory has been in buttressing the investigation of collective phenomena with proverbial individualism, a glaring discrepancy is noticeable in the conjectural linkages made between early traits and later actions of subjects, as if human nature were static and so easily definable in watertight compartments, if not a 'supreme fiction' as Ranke's historicist school alleged. Freud himself raised his theory on the basis of the highly constricted sphere of Viennese fin de siecle bourgeoisie. His infamous biographical essay on Leonardo da Vinci was proof of the shrunkenness of his territory42. Wolfenstein, a later day psychohistorian, has posited that Gandhi became a revolutionary leader in order to break free from the successive identity crises of manhood, Hinduism and Indian-ness that cast a shroud upon his childhood and adolescence. But his revolutionary leadership was, to majority historians, a continuum from the heroic resistance to racial injustice to Indians in South Africa, i.e. a mission. Wolfenstein claims that the Salt March to Dandi (1930) was Gandhi's expression to overcome the guilt and shame he had accumulated inside him.
Lastly, after freedom was
achieved, he is claimed to have rejected power because it stood for
“political fatherhood” and instead he was seen nursing and healing victims
of partition riots in Bengal and the Punjab, a preference for feminine
traits44.
Again, facts state that Gandhi had formally resigned from Congress in 1934
itself and probably held inflexibility in the party responsible for the
partition. Under no circumstances could he have taken power into his own
hands over such a party and over a 'truncated India' after 1947.
Evidently, Freudian
techniques, if not explicitly conceded as speculative, can twist known
facts and promulgate biases that can be as fallacious as Myth-making
histories. Wolfenstein, aware of this inadequacy, accepts in his
conclusion that psychoanalysis does not provide definitive solutions to
biography. The social and political ambience which surround an individual
as he takes up a self-assigned position in history are entirely obfuscated
by an obsession for merely the workings of the subject-mind and
heedlessness for external stimuli and contingencies. When heeded, we get
appallingly airy hypotheses about continental psychological sways such as
this:
“A product of the great
Eurasian state, Lenin was a blend of many of the features of his origins:
Russian radicalism, European civilisation, Jewish intelligence and Asiatic
audacity and cruelty”45
Even internal impulses and
responses are difficult to fathom in the case of lesser candour than
Gandhi, say Lenin, Trotsky or Mao. Georges Lefebvre's use of psychology to
interpret Napoleon was bereft of the defects we have noted. But when he
leaves the question of what lay in the Emperor's mind (“irresistible
impulse of the temperament”) on the occasion of the Continental Blockade
for the reader to mull over46,
the frontier limitation of such a 'delve-deep' method is laid bare.
Having laid down a critique of
individualism in historiography, we return to Neale's question about
obituarising biography. His answer in the 1950s had been a firm negative47.
He saw more than one merit in a personal story. One cannot fully
comprehend the nature and functioning of any group without sketching the
individuals who compose it. Biographies must therefore be compiled as
individual units of a larger matrix and then concatenated in tabular form
as statistics to provide a detailed analysis of the entire matrix's group
behaviour. A proforma 'facts table', thus contrived, could have columns
such as: social class, occupation, age and education, religious
affinities, family relationships, peculiarities and personal traits etc.
The mass networking of biographies in this schematic mould would
undoubtedly be recognition of the expanded social context, for it is a
concern for individuals within a group or class. By this deductive method
of synthesis, generalised theories for particular groups could be
propounded. In what might be taken as the latest authoritative opinion on
biography, Ian Kershaw has propounded a similar 'new approach' to Hitler,
“one which attempts to integrate the actions of the Dictator into the
political structures and social forces which conditioned his acquisition
and exercise of power”48.
One might argue that ideologically fragmented movements like the English
Levellers of the 17th century cannot yield a synthesis since
John Lilburne, Richard Overton and William Walvyn had conflicting views
and lives. But it is a tribute to the biographic approach that we are able
to first of all judge the Levellers as a disjointed group.
The Subaltern Personality
By situating the individual in
a broader context alone, the imbalanced ills of historiography do not
vanish. Where Freud wanes after a point, Foucault might be an apposite
reference to historians. One never knows events or issues as they really
happened and no absolute truth accompanies the history we have received
and internalised. What cynical Napoleon defined as “a pack of lies agreed
upon”, history has often been subject to “ideological use”49
by proposing continuities in diverse phenomena when they might not even
have existed. Historians discovered patterns of connection and causality
on the basis of “revealed or imposed patterns”50,
these patterns of knowledge themselves being governed by Power and
'injustice', weapons exercised by elite over the population. Those who
never tried self-projection or did not achieve Power to influence the
episteme were assumed by historians to lack historicity and import.
This was an egregious error, for every human “not only has history all
around him, but is himself, in his own historicity”51.
Virginia Woolf's protestation echoes the same idea: “Is not anyone who has
lived a life and left a record of that life, worthy of biography?”52.
The challenge is thus “to revise the way in which we traditionally write
the history of History”53,
one that Jacques Derrida took one step forward by coining the word
'deconstruction'54.
The argument for a wider
Subaltern perspective in world history is corroborated by the ‘Action
Dispensability’ factor that plagues the ‘Great Persons’ complex. As the
social net expands, the capacity of single actors to shape events becomes
circumscribed by adventitious factors. Fred Greenstein notes them as viz.
the degree to which the environment admits to restructuring; the actor’s
strategic location in the environment (Nehru could not have monopolised
foreign policy had he not been Prime Minister in a newly independent India
bereft of a foreign office); and the personal strengths or weaknesses of
the actor, which as already noted are Protean and differing colours to
differing eyes62.
Personality, writes philosopher novelist Salman Rushdie, is a “half
reconstructed affair of memory and voices”63
and an unreliable base for entire historical causation to rest. Ipso
facto, Solzhenitsyn’s ‘Ivan Denisovich’ is a better guide to the
labour camp experience than numerous biographies harping on the evil
schemes of Stalin as prisoner of a linear mind64.
The former is representative of the fates of millions, although in
fictional biographical form, while the latter is psychological speculation
whose side effects have already been discussed. For maintaining reader
interest, Neale had revolted against “factual characters” which do not
‘live’65.
A good historical biography should combine both and strike a ‘fine
balance’. More works like Hugh Trevor-Roper’s ‘A Hdden Lfe: The Enigma of
Sir Edmund Backhouse’ (1976), preserving both the individual raciness and
the spirit of the ‘new social history’ drive in English historiography,
have to be produced for Subalternity to catch on in European writing. This
is, of course, predicated upon availability of source-material, which is a
major vexation for those wishing to research unexplored territory and
personalitites on the periphery.
The King is Dead: Long Live the King
In conclusion, note must be
taken of recent trends in historiography which appear to be diluting
further the agenda of pure individualism. Within political history itself,
a former bastion of individual acts of super-persons, attention has now
turned to political cultures as an object of central enquiry. The journey
from Stalin to Stalinism has been symptomatic of the move from analysis of
underlying personality structure to analysis of the political and social
structure through a process of ‘aggregation’ and ‘building up’ of
inferential chains66.
New economic historians, demographic historians, historians of science and
gender, diplomatic historians and environmental historians have likewise
shifted to process and structure assay. The individual survives the
assault of post-modernism riding the nag of beneficial purposes of
biography we tallied, albeit in a mellowed and atomised incarnation, in
the role of paradigm not paragon, and as a lead to assemble a fuller
picture not as an end in himself. If these distinctions are not
maintained, the line separating fact from Myth and history from general
literature might be blurred.
A fresh biography sketches Mao
Tse-Tung personally micro-managing the goriest persecutions of the
Cultural Revolution in China[72].
Pope John Paul II’s act in bringing about the downfall of Communism in
Eastern Europe is now widely recognised73.
The fallacy of the ‘mass-man’74
(treating individuals as if they were automatons merely filling in the
vaguely defined collectivity known as ‘masses’) can do odious harm to the
innate historicity in the human being. Borrowing Harold Laski’s famous
phrase, ‘eternal vigilance’ is the price of retaining the proposed ‘fine
balance’ of historiography. It is hoped that this balance will also
trickle down into popular biographical works and sober the ever-in-demand
hagiographic genre.
Footnotes
1 Z.A.Bhutto, If I Am Assassinated (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), p.132 2 Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris (London: Allen Lane, 1998) 3 R.Gittings, The Nature of Biography (London: Heineman, 1978), p.19 [1] On Heroes and Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (London: Ward, Lock & co. 1900) 5 cited in E.H.Carr, What is History? (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964) p.xxviii 6 Nehru, A Tryst with Destiny (Oxford: OUP, 1996) 7 Gittings op cit. p.18 8 ibid. p.20 9 Biography as an Art, ed. J.L.Clifford (Oxford: OUP, 1962) p.84 10 ibid. p.126 11 Essays in Elizabethan History (London: Jonathan Cape, 1958) p. 225-237 12 Modes of Production in History (London: Routledge, 1989) p. 109 13 Fundamental Problems of Marxism (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1937) p.139-177 14 ibid. p.153 15 ibid. p.145
16 Carr op cit. p. 29 17 A.L Guerard, Reflections on the Napoleonic Legend (London: T.Fisher Unwin, 1924) p. 26 18 op cit. p.21-23 19 A.Ward, Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age (New York: OUP, 1955) 20 R.Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999) 21 The Struggle for Pakistan (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1969) p. 114 22 cited in N.Tumarkin, Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia (Cambridge: HUP, 1983) p.106 23 ibid. extract from Izvestia (1924) 24 G.Hosking, History of the Soviet Union 1917-1991 (London: Fontana, 1990) p.143 25 J.Stalin, Foundations of Leninism (New York: International Publishers, 1974) p. 57-60
26 ibid. p.119 27 I.Deutscher, The prophet Outcast. Trotsky:1929-1940 (London: OUP, 1970) p. 242 28 S.Lukes, Individualism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973) p. 6-7 29 Guerard op cit. p. 102 30 P.Geyl, Napoleon: For and Against (London: Cape, 1949) p. 25
31 L.G.Mitchell, Charles James Fox (Oxford: OUP, 1992) 32 N.B.Penny, 'The Whig Cult of Fox in Early 19th Century Sculpture', Past and Present (1976) 33 D.Blackburn, Populists and Patricians: Essays in Modern German History (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987) 34 Discussed extensively in A.Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) and H.Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s Table Talk 1941-44 (Oxford: OUP, 1953) 35 Young Man Luther- A Study in Psychoanalysis and History (London: Faber, 1959) p. 255 36 ibid. p. 257 36 An Autobiography Or the Story of My Experiments with Truth (Ahmedabad: Navjivan Publications, 1940) 37 E.V.Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi (Princeton: PUP, 1967) 38 P.Loewenberg, Decoding the Past: the Psychohistorical Approach (New York: Knopf, 1983) p.3 39 ibid. p.17 40 A technique elucidated in J.A.Garraty, The Nature of Biography (London: Cape, 1958) p.192
41 Gittings op cit. p. 30 42 P.Gay, Freud for Historians (Oxford: OUP, 1985) 43 G.Pandey, Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh, 1926-34: A Study in Imperfect Mobilisation (Delhi: OUP, 1978) 44 All references in this paragraph are to Wolfenstein op cit. 45 D.A.Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire: Political Leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev (London: Harper Collins, 1998) p. 46 cited in Geyl op cit. p.390 47 op cit. p. 48 op cit. Introduction 49 A.Sheridan, Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth (London: Tavistock, 1980) p.92 50 ibid. p. 91
51
M.Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human
Sciences (London: Tavistock, 1970) 52 cited in op cit. ed. Clifford p.133 53 M.Foucault, op cit. p.370 54 J.Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: JHU Press, 1974) p.24 55 R.Guha, 'The Small Voice of History', in Subaltern Studies IX, ed. S.Amin (Delhi: OUP, 1996)
56 cited in op cit. ed. J.LClifford, p.41 57 'Four Rebels of 1857`, in Subaltern Studies IV, ed. R.Guha (Delhi: OUP, 1985)
58
ibid. 'Jitu Santal's Movement in Malda, 1924-32: A Study in Tribal
Protest'
59 R.Guha, 'Chandra's Death', in Subaltern Studies V, ed. R.Guha (Delhi: OUP, 1987)
60
'Writing, Orality and Power in the Dangs, Western India, 1800s -
1920s', in Subaltern Studies IX, ed. S.Amin (Delhi: OUP, 1996) 61 The Historical, Political and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, ed. C.E.Detmold (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1891) p.136 62 Personality and Politics (New York: Norton, 1981) 63 The Satanic Verses (London: Viking, 1988) 64 For instance, D.Volkogonov, Stalin, Triumph and Tragedy (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1991) 65 op cit. 66 Greenstein op cit. p. 120 67 The Hero in History, A Study in Limitation and Possibility (London: Secker & Warburg, 1945) pp.19-20 68 op cit. p. 161 69 Blackburn op cit. p.45 70 op cit. Introduction XXIX 71 J.A.Getty & O.V.Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939 (London: Yale University Press, 1999) 72 J.Chang & J.Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005) 73 A.Applebaum, ‘How the Pope Defeated Communism’, in The Washington Post, April 6, 2005 p.A19 74 D.H.Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (London: Harper & Row, 1970) p.207
[Sreeram Chaulia is a columnist for Asia Times, Hong Kong, currently pursuing a PhD in Humanitarian Policies at the Maxwell School of Citizenship, Syracuse, New York. He holds two Bachelors degrees in History from the Universities of Delhi and Oxford, and two Masters degrees in International Relations from the Universities of London and Syracuse. He has authored 130 articles and reviews in numerous journals, magazines and newspapers and is Contributing Editor to the forthcoming book, 'People Who Influenced the World in the Last 100 Years' (Murray Books, Adelaide). He has worked for international humanitarian and peace organisations.] |
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