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BOOK
REVIEW
Diehard legionnaires
Hizbullah. The Story From Within by Naim
Qassem
Reviewed by Sreeram Chaulia
Official histories of guerrilla movements are double-edged
swords. On one hand, they offer rare peeks into internal
goings-on in secretive organizations, and on the other, they
are apologies for controversial deeds and views. Hezbollah's
deputy secretary general, Sheikh Naem Qassem, profiles his
Islamist legion as if it were a paragon of virtues,
sprinkling occasional candid disclosures. The book is his
self-set mission to prove that "the
 essential
nature of Hezbollah is moderate" and to snub Western
allegations of terrorism. Despite some dubious assertions,
readers benefit from understanding the shrewdness and tact
of this radical Lebanese power that rattled Israel.
The early 1960s heralded the embryonic "Islamic condition"
in Lebanon. Shi'ite clerics returning from Najaf (Iraq)
shaped congregations to give an Islamic redirection to life
in the face of dereliction of welfare duties by the state.
The imams were outspoken critics of Israel, consecrating
belligerent outfits like Amal to assist the Palestinian
struggle. Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1978 and the
Iranian Revolution in 1979 raised the stakes for ushering in
an Islamic government in Beirut through a united resistance
army of Muslims based on the jihad structure. Existing
militant groups merged to form Hezbollah (Army of Allah)
with the blessings of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
Hezbollah was a creation of Iran just as the Taliban was of
Pakistan. Qassem, however, claims "no connection between the
internal administration of the Iranian state and Hezbollah's
administration". (p 57) Further, Hezbollah is credited with
"independence in the work arena" (p 237) vis-a-vis Tehran.
Spiritually, financially and militarily, the reign of the
Iranian ayatollahs was and is Hezbollah's lifeline.
The party had total conviction in the Koran and jihad. It
"served Allah and shunned false gods". (p 22) Concern for
politics affecting fellow Muslims was paramount. An Islamic
state was thought to be "the supreme representation of human
happiness". (p 30) Qassem advocates "free public choice" in
an Islamic state, though this was belied by Hezbollah's
moral policing in Iran and Lebanon. It banned casinos,
concerts, dances and beauty contests and defended the
gender-iniquitous Muslim personal law by averring, "What God
almighty legalizes cannot be prohibited by anyone." (p 213)
Qassem names jihad as "basic behavior in a Muslim's life".
When the nation (ummah) was subject to humiliation,
the enemy had to be conquered by paying any price. If a
Muslim mother fearing bereavement hid her son from battle,
it meant "deviation from obedience to God". After losing his
own son in 1997 to Israeli bombardment, Hezbollah's
secretary general, Hasan Nasrullah, proclaimed, "We do not
spare our children. We pride ourselves when our sons fall
martyrs." (p.121) The godly promise of victory for jihad was
a sufficient motive to keep fighting against injustice.
Martyred blood raised "youth's sense of responsibility" and
abstracted "tameness and acquiescence among the people". (p
172)
Hezbollah's ideology and party membership center on jihad
credentials. Yet, to avoid the pitfall of excluding others
in multi-confessional Lebanon, it opened doors to Sunnis,
Druzes and Christians through peripheral membership and
independent circles. Among 12 Hezbollah MPs in the 1992
Lebanese parliament, there were two Sunnis, one Catholic and
one Maronite. The party entered into pragmatic dialogues
with Maronite, Orthodox, Catholic, Armenian and Assyrian
orders. When Jezzine was liberated from Israeli control in
1999, Hezbollah did not harm the majority Christian civilian
population and exhorted abolition of sectarianism. The
following year, disciplined Islamist partisans stayed the
hand of vengeance against families of Lahdist collaborators.
Uniting Lebanese society against Israel was the chief
imperative. The party did not enter the crux of the Lebanese
civil war, warding off conflict against internal sectarian
factions. Intra-Muslim confrontations were distractions from
the Zionist enemy. When the "Palestinian Camps War" broke
out in 1985 in Beirut, Hezbollah assisted in its abatement.
Clashes with the Amal faction between 1988 and 1990 were
dissolved amicably after Iranian and Syrian intervention.
Syria's "political cover was needed" often to inhibit
recurring tensions with the Lebanese army over deployment
and control of the South.
Qassem exults that Hezbollah had no field desertions in its
two-decade war with Israel. Abandonment of jihad was a
disgrace, loss and demise inviting punishment from God. In
Imam Ali's words, "Death shall defeat you in life, and you
shall defeat life through death." Citing Ali's son Husain as
a role model, Qassem describes love for martyrdom as "part
of the love for God". (p 45) Martyrdom vitalized Islam in
Lebanon most speedily and prompted Israel to withdraw almost
entirely in the year 2000. Qassem quotes a Knesset member,
"Hezbollah not only drove our army mad but left the whole of
Israel insane." Even after 2000, the war was ongoing in the
Sheba Farms region and over the dispute about Arab captives
in Israeli prisons. The party engaged in exchange
hostage-taking of Israelis, but not of victims belonging to
other nationalities.
The proficiency with which Hezbollah executed rocket
launches, bombs and trap tactics was matched by a "steadfast
desire for highly dangerous activities". Cultivation of
dogged belief in martyrdom was a result of "spiritual
mobilization" that could "only be as thorough within an
Islamic context". (p 75) A successful operation was
considered one that wounded, killed or expelled Israeli
occupiers. When hurting Israeli soldiers was inadequate to
deter the latter's targeting of Lebanese civilians,
Hezbollah directly beleaguered Israeli civilians in
Palestine. Aggression was met with reciprocity, especially
when Israel and the US kidnapped or assassinated fiery
Shi'ite clerics in South Lebanon. Being a geographically
focused combatant, Hezbollah felt it futile to hit Western
targets around the world.
Hezbollah postponed involvement in Lebanese politics for a
while, since its primary mission was jihad. Its "Open
Letter" was issued in 1985, two years after foundation. The
party's decision to jump into electoral politics in 1992
came following intense internal debate about whether it
amounted to abandoning the Islamic vision. There was
apprehension that representative democracy did not conform
to overall Islamic philosophy and that entering parliament
would soften the zest for jihad. Hezbollah MPs abstained
from participation in government religiously and it was only
in 2005 that they accepted a cabinet ministry.
Hezbollah was never convinced of the efficacy of political
negotiations with Israel. Resistance was "the only available
solution for the power imbalance". (p 73) The May 17 Accord
in 1983 under American auspices "cuffed Lebanon within its
own territory". The 1989 Taif Accord was unsatisfactory for
its failure to eliminate sectarianism. The 1993 Oslo
Agreement was "a dangerous free gift to Israel". The only
agreement the party appreciated was the Syrian and
Iranian-brokered ceasefire in 1996.
Delivery of social services received top priority attention
from Hezbollah. It reconstructed buildings damaged by
Israeli air raids, distributed water and agricultural
credit, and opened health centers, educational institutions
and mosques. Special care was taken of civilians injured in
the war and for "following up on public and private
plights". (p 204)
Hezbollah was fiercely devoted to the Palestinian cause,
avowing that "it is not permissible to squander the land of
Muslims" and that "liberation is a natural obligation for
which all Muslims are liable". (p 168) Targeting of Israeli
civilians by Hamas and Islamic jihad was necessary to
"achieve balance in the domain of horror". (p 175) Qassem
posits Hezbollah's tactics as an inspirational ray of hope
for Palestinians.
Shi'ite-Sunni bonding to confront American hegemony was a
fundamental tenet of the party. It successfully thwarted US
efforts to isolate Hezbollah from its patrons, Iran and
Syria. It refused overtures for talks with Washington and
checked "the imported view of events from predominating" the
Middle East through its radio station, al-Nour, and TV
station, al-Manar.
Today, Hezbollah is a reality entrenched at the core of
Lebanon, with strong structural basis for endurance. "The
believer's ability to resist is permanent and exponential".
(p 269) Despite the recent withdrawal of the Syrian army,
the party has its ways and means of retaining the protecting
hand of Damascus. Given the cyclical nature of Middle
Eastern politics, we can be sure that Qassem's committed
legionnaires will continue to be major factors in war and
peace.
Hizbullah. The Story From Within by Naim Qassem, Saqi
Books, London, 2005. ISBN: 0863565174. Price: US$ 42.50, 320
pages.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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republishing.) |
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