The Prime Minister occupies a unique status in India's
representative parliamentary democracy. He is simultaneously the
leader of the ruling party, primus inter pares in the union
cabinet, leader of the Lok Sabha and foreman of the country at
large. Although unspecified in the Constitution, he has come to
occupy the position of de facto ruler of India, wielding real
power and exercising it in the name of the people and the chief
executive, the President. Owing to the enormous
responsibilities, challenges and authority vested in the hands
of the Prime Minister, a study of his/her personality is one of
the best means of understanding and assessing the achievements
and failures of the post-colonial state. Janardan Thakur has
carved a niche for himself in the realm of critical political
analysis right since independence and it is befitting that the
veteran journalist and author who professes ``a lifelong affair
with Prime Ministers" has attempted a comprehensive Tour d'
Horizon of the cavalcade from Nehru to Vajpayee.
Jawaharlal
Nehru (1947-1964) Top
``The last Englishman to rule India" was ironically a
symbol of Swaraj and in this lies the secret of his unchallenged
17-year stint as Prime Minister. Thakur argues in the Lapierre-Collins
line (Mountbatten and the Partition of India) that Nehru was
under a charmed spell of the Mountbattens and connived in the
latter's plan of partitioning the country for the lure of power.
Putatively, the Viceroy used ``two Menons", Krishna and V.P,
to induce in Nehru and Patel flat rejection of Gandhi's offer
that Jinnah be made Prime Minister of united India. Freedom was
thus 'aborted'. Nehru's record as PM was dominated till 1950 by
a subterranean power struggle with the iron man, Patel, and
generally with the Gandhian right (Rajendra Prasad and Kripalani).
Although his courage, dignity and charisma were unparalleled,
Nehru ``suffered fools and corrupt men around him",
notoriously Pratap Singh Kairon in Punjab. Corruption and
dynastic tendencies began clawing at the system in the later
half of Nehru Raj. While he carved a bipartisan foreign policy
championed by all and sundry, his brush with Socialism and
obsession for Planning in a ``third way" offered no uplift
to the economy. His decision to refer Afridi invasion of Kashmir
in 1948 to the UN (also under Mountbatten's spell) was the worst
legacy to later generations. The 1962 Chinese invasion revealed
deep chinks in his panchsheel and caused a complete rejection of
his pacifist worldview.
Lal
Bahadur Shastri (1964-1966) Top
Shastri was seen as a stopgap arrangement for Indira
Priyadarshini to take over ultimately. The murky 'Kamraj Plan'
was hatched in Nehru's last years to sustain the dynasty (Motilal
had after all anointed Jawahar astride a horse as Congress
President in the 1929 Lahore Congress and there seemed little
doubt that Indira had to be next) and Shastri appeared a safe
bet, ``the little sparrow" almost too self-effacing and
dignified to refuse handing over the baton when Indira was
ready. But while the Nehru coterie accumulated contempt and
scorn for ``pathetically ineffectual Shastriji" (K.Hutheesingh),
Lal roared Jai Jawan Jai Kisan in the 1965 war and negotiated
with great mettle at Tashkent. Indira, chafing under the laurels
this 'mediocre' disciple of her father was earning for his
Spartan life, battle against corruption and resolute leadership
in war, complained later that he was ``unnecessarily
glorified" and a cover-up campaign was launched later to
denigrate or whittle down Shastri's achievements. Thakur argues
that he was a little colossus, a principled politician like no
other, the ``most authentically Indian Prime Minster" who
as a penurious student swam across the Ganga to visit his dying
mother in Mughalsarai and who was still poor enough to buy
woollens on the way to Uzbekistan as Prime Minister. To this
day, Indians rate Shastri No.1 in popularity among all PMs (eg.
Centre of Media Studies Opinion Poll,1991, 1995).
Indira
Gandhi (1966-1977, 1980-1984) Top
Phase II of the Kamaraj Plan was to hoist Indira into the chair
so that the Syndicate could use the goongi gudiya as a
marionette. With slow but assuring steps, Indira trounced all
inner-party rivals to be labelled ``the only man in the
cabinet", a ruthless politician of the finest calibre, one
who would have fitted Churchill's top criterion for Prime
Ministership- ``butchery". Her new pro-poor economic
policies from 1969 were political strategies to discredit
Morarji, Kamraj and Nijalingappa. They also earned her a firm
constituency, the downtrodden who to this day swear by 'Indiramma'
and the spiel, ``Garibi hatao". She also displayed, in
Rafiq Zakaria's words, ``understanding of the real security
needs of the country and the geo-politics of the
subcontinent", severing Pakistan into two in a carefully
calculated demarche that earned her the title 'Maha Durga' from
Vajpayee. The apotheosis went to her head and from ``India is
Indira", she stooped down to authoritarian ways,
centralisation, nepotism, indulgence in black marketeers and
rigged elections. Emergency (1975-77) undid the glory of
Bangladesh's liberation, severely damaged democratic civil
liberties and sowed seeds of criminalisation of politics with
the rise of 'Son of India', Sanjay Gandhi. Her Dasharath-like
dependence and blind love for a hoodlum of a son unfortunately
survived the historic electoral defeat of 1977 till his death in
1980. Her second innings was a jump from ``mania to
megalomania", as state governments were toyed with and
Frankensteins like Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale (``just a
spiritual leader", she used to call him!) were nurtured
with catastrophic consequences. Blue Star and her own gory end
were outcomes of her paranoia and arrogance.
Morarji
Desai (1977-1979) Top
A 'Gandhian' in personal life, Morarjibhai was an ambitious
power-hungry politician gunning for Prime Ministership right
since Nehru's death. As JP's nominee over Charan Sigh and
Jagjivan Ram, as the mantle-carrier of the ``Second
Freedom" that promised a moral renaissance from dynastic
rut and as the country's first non-Congress PM, Morarji failed
to live up to the euphoria of Janata Party triumph. While
claiming to be a man of principles, he mimicked Mrs.Gandhi by
overlooking the extra-constitutional power his son Kanti Desai
accumulated over two years. While armed with an able foreign
minister and an admirable catchphrase, ``genuine
no-alignment", his government struggled under the mutual
contradictions of an ad hoc coalition and debilitative
infighting. Mounting industrial disorder, collapse of higher
education and all-time-high corruption were his only legacies.
Chaudhary
Charan Singh (1979-1980) Top
Driven by the obsession of becoming Prime Minister at least
once, no matter how long or how consequential, the doughty Jat
was the most forgettable PM till date. His uniqueness lay in
being the first provincial leader to don the spurs of national
supremo as well as symbolising the rise of new upwardly mobile
middle-caste dominant peasants such as Jats, Yadavs and Kurmis
(later to be catapulted by VP Singh). A virtual puppet of Sanjay
Gandhi, who supported from outside, Charan Singh's government
completed the Janata burlesque and paved the way for Mrs.
Gandhis' return.
Rajiv
Gandhi (1984-1989) Top
The new 'Son of India' was, according to Thakur, an
``anti-politician who failed". His record landslide victory
(401 MPs) and clean technocratic image appealed greatly to urban
middle classes and youth, who pinned hopes on the dawn of a
'brave new world' where managers and Computerised
``Baba-log" would clean up the hacks and corrupt souls of
the Indira era, liberalise the economy and heal growing
insurgencies in Punjab and Assam. Accords were signed, however
specious, foreign dignitaries were impressed (Reagan, Gorbachev,
Zia and Jayawardene were all infinitely charmed) and an in-house
reform of Congress was also mooted in the 'Year of Hope', 1985.
Yet, Rajiv floundered somewhere and returned to the regal and
Caesarist style of his mother, gathering coteries of notoriously
venal politicians around him (``a love fest of
sycophancy"), peddling an overly-activist foreign policy
that endangered hitherto existing foundations (Operation
Brassstacks, IPKF, Afghanistan etc.) and flouting procedural
norms by misinforming or non-informing the President of
important national and international developments (according to
Thakur, Zail Singh was so peeved at Rajiv's imperiousness that
he repeatedly plotted to dismiss him). Then came Bofors and the
downhill slide was complete. Rajiv returned into reckoning after
the spoof of the National Front in 1991, but it is unlikely that
the Congress would have come within reach of power had he not
been tragically assassinated.
Vishwanath
Pratap Singh (1989-1990) Top
The Raja of Manda attempted another Janata-type ``master
management of contradictions" and ended up as a bizarre
experimenter, much ridiculed and bantered. His self-professed
``value-based politics" and anti-corruption (read Bofors)
plank flew in the face of fractious squabbling within the
National Front, a rag-tag assemblage of Communists, Casteists
and Rightists joined together only to taste the crumbs of power.
It was during his regime that the Kashmir popular insurgency was
ignited, thanks to a most timorous exchange of terrorists for
the Home Minster's daughter, a price we are paying to this day.
The rise of Devi Lal and Sons overshadowed every other
denouement under Singh, making a mockery of his claims of
political morality (Thakur relates how the Tau and Singh stuck a
deal to oust Chandra Shekhar in return for the Haryana
strongman's Deputy Prime Ministership). While Meham electoral
violations shocked the nation, Singh also failed to provide
conclusive evidence of Rajiv's involvement in Bofors, the basis
of his own rise. In an Indira-imitative move, Singh discovered a
``messiah of the Backwards" card, Mandal, late into his
reign, to steal the thunder from a rampaging Devi Lal. 27
percent reservations for OBCs remained his only contribution to
posterity, a socio-political revolution that had far-reaching
impact in the nineties. Thakur posits that BJP devised Mandir as
an antidote to Mandal. Advani's Rath Yatra followed, another
revolutionary political change that drowned VP Singh.
Chandrashekhar
(November 1990-June 1991) Top
The 'Young Turk' finally got a ride! Just like Charan Singh, he
was supported by Rajiv's Congress from outside and just like
Charan Singh, he was pooh-poohed to an ignominious exit. For all
his 'true socialist' motivations under JP, Chandrashekhar stood
for no values or commitments whatsoever, a charlatan game enough
to admit that ``you cannot avoid certain people" to rise in
politics. India's economy reached the edge of the precipice
under him, having to sell gold to bolster depleted foreign
exchange reserves in 1991. His dalliances with conmen and
notorious anti-national elements like Chandraswami and Adnan
Khashoggi completed a tale of woe and made his government the
``second national disaster" after VP Singh's.
P.V.
Narasimha Rao (1991-1996) Top
A PM by accident, he displayed the uncanny shrewdness of a ``Machiavelli
and Chanakya rolled into one" to survive for five years
with a razor-thin majority. He neutralised rivals like Arjun
Singh and Sharad Pawar, pulverised the shadow of No.10 Janpath
and also retained the confidence of the Lok Sabha by splintering
opposition groups with a chess player's consummate skill. Coming
at a time when stability was becoming scarce, he also breathed
relief to an election-weary country, although by devious
methods. PV was the first south Indian to rule from Delhi, thus
breaking the cow belt's monopoly over central power. He oversaw
economic liberalisation and reform that have changed the face of
India for the better and will earn him a place in the firmament.
The impetus for a post-Cold War foreign policy by remoulding
India's interests was also given shape to in these years. On the
flip side, ``Scamomania" gripped India- Harshad Mehta,
Hawala, Sugar, Fertilisers, Chandra Swami etc.- and an unholy
precedent of a sitting PM being indicted directly for corruption
took seat. That the Congress found itself emasculated by the end
of Rao's term was largely a result of his unscrupulous survival
tactics.
Atal
Behari Vajpayee (May 16th -June 1st
1996, March 1998 onward) Top
Had it not been for the Hawala diaries naming Advani as a
recipient, the Sangh Parivar may have chosen him as PM for the
fleeting 13 days. Others maintain that Vajpayee was chosen
specifically because the government could not last the travails
of a hung parliament. Whatever the case, BJP began a trend
towards claiming the political centre from Congress by refusing
to horse-trade for MPs in 1996. Vajpayee ``left a deep niche in
the hearts and minds of the people" and left them wanting
for more of him. Thakur feels that Vajpayee comes nearest to
Indira Gandhi as ``Prime Minister material", imbued with
charisma, idealism and rhetoric that can concretise the
aspirations of the people and emote with them. However, he is
hampered by all kinds of coalitional and ideological divisions.
His first coalition was rocked repeatedly by one of modern
India's most mendacious politicians, Jayalalitha. His second
coalition is stabler, but one only needs to ask how long! His
relations with Advani are subject to intense speculation,
although whatever rivalry is evident to pressmen seems largely
overestimated. The parallel of Nehru-Patel rivalry appears
tantalising yet far fetched. Vajpayee's liberal ``mask" is
seen by many as sheltering the BJP's ``hidden agenda", one
of majoritarianism and intolerance of non-Hindus. His long
stewardship of foreign policy may yet be his lasting
contribution.
H.D.Deve
Gowda (1996-1997) Top
Another accidental PM, the ``humble farmer" from Karnataka
left little impact on Indian polity. His ``singular point of
reference was Ramakrishna Hegde", archrival of yore, whom
he sought to downsize and humiliate using the Prime Ministership
and a much discredited Subramaniam Swami. RK Laxman's famous
cartoon depicting Gowda in office with a bloated map of his home
state in the background and a tiny speck of an Indian map tells
it all! Gowda had no vision beyond his home battlegrounds (He
once asked, ``Does a Prime Minister need to know what CTBT
is?") Perhaps this was a reflection of his shady creation
by regional parties (TDP, DMK, AGP, NC). His problems with
Laloo's Casteists, the ``angry old Communists" led by
Indrajit Gupta, and the ghoulish Sitaram Kesri reverberated the
travesty of coalition politics and did him in.
Inder
Kumar Gujral (1997-1998) Top
Suave diplomat (the 'Gujral Doctrine' remains a viable foreign
policy option) and academic who owed his entire career to the
Gandhi family, Gujral became PM thanks to a most unlikely
'mentor', Laloo Yadav who was bent on stopping fellow OBC
Mulayam Yadav from grabbing the top job. A principled man whose
only weakness had been loyalty to Indira, Gujral hung on for 11
months, a creditable job considering the circumstances. Hemmed
in by contradictory pressures from the UF (read Karunanidhi) and
from a Congress insistent on publicising the Jain Commission
report on Rajiv's assassination, he was living testimony of the
complete moribundity of the ``third force" idea in Indian
politics.
Epilogue Top
Indira Gandhi at times was the only PM that ever made us proud
of being Indian. It was a pity that her immense abilities and
energy were qualified by utterly despicable and horrifying
tendencies. It is equally a pity that Shastri died untimely or
that a man of Vajpayee's calibre wallows in an 'instability
complex' to be of much eventuality. Of course, one cannot but
get a mixed bag in politics, some greatness and some foibles.
This is the story of Indian politics over five decades, using
reportage and clinical analysis- a collector's item for all who
are fascinated and troubled by India's democratic journey from
Midnight to Millennium.
This article is a review of Janardan
Thakur's "Prime Ministers - Nehru to Vajpayee" (Eeshwar
Publications, 1999) by Sreeram Sundar Chaulia. Sreeram Sundar
Chaulia studied Indian History at St.Stephen's College, Delhi,
and took a second BA in Modern History from University College,
Oxford. He is currently analysing BJP's Foreign Policy at the
London School of Economics and Political Science. This article
was published in IndiaServer's August 2000 issue.