

BJP, India's Foreign Policy and the "Realist Alternative" to the Nehruvian Tradition

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Abstract. Correlation between domestic political factors and a country's foreign policy is crucial. This essay is a case study of India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), its ideological precepts and approach to foreign policy-making. The fundamentals of the Nehruvian world outlook, which have guided almost all pre-BJP governments in India, are first elaborated and their evolution discussed in the historical context of post-independence India. BJP core ideology and promise of radically overturning this Nehruvian consensus are then taken up and empirically tested against three significant theatres of Indian foreign policy since 1998 – nuclear proliferation, relations with Pakistan and ties with the USA. Conclusions are drawn that the Nehruvian tradition has survived BJP's rhetorical and ideological challenge and that notwithstanding the party's braggadocio about altering the discourse on India's place and attitude towards the world, the standards and benchmarks set by Nehru at the time of freedom continue to inform the present Indian government's foreign policy.

Introduction

When the foreign policy of India is discussed it cannot be that while other countries refer to Pandit Nehru we may not mention him. I had said it earlier and want to reiterate it again today – to differ from Nehru is one thing, but he is a part of India's heritage.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee¹

Of the myriad possibilities that independent India confronted, the ones reified into official policy bore the personal imprint and character of Jawaharlal Nehru, first and longest-serving Prime Minister (1947-1964). Nowhere was the influence of this "architect of modern India" more monumental, singular and enduring than in foreign policy and external relations. The foundational edifice he engineered in India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) arguably outlived other Nehruvian nation-building legacies like Fabian Socialism, dirigisme, and secularism, and guided successive regimes. This was borne out when India's sitting President, K.R.Narayanan, declared in a convention-breaking interview on the eve of the Golden Jubilee of freedom, "Nehru is not dead" as far as the country's foreign policy was concerned.²

The leitmotif of my essay is that 37 years after "*Panditji*"³ relinquished his obsessive and officious grasp over India, the worldview and epistemic parameters he

bequeathed live on despite changing winds of domestic politico-ideological forces. Political actors with radically non-Nehruvian ideologies may control levers of power and decision-making, but the quintessence of Indian foreign policy was laid out by the original helmsman.

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) will be best remembered in history for ushering India into the nuclear weapons club in May 1998. This event putatively signified a break from Nehruvian non-proliferation ideals and elicited BJP boasts of implementing its “alternative model capable of shaking the roots of the Congress party’s foreign policy.”⁴ The BJP’s earlier avatar, Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), had likewise prompted judgments of wielding a foreign policy systemically different from that of Congress’ and triggered speculations of “major shifts in international perceptions”⁵ during its cameo as ruling coalition partner in India’s first non-Congress Janata government (1977-1979). But these assertions must be situated within the larger question of how important political party credos, particularly those of cadre-based and ideologically-driven parties like the BJP, are as domestic inputs of foreign policy. This is a highly relevant query for a multi-party parliamentary democracy like India.

Article 246 of the Indian Constitution grants Parliament the exclusive power to legislate *inter alia* on (1) Defence of India, (15) War and peace, (6) Atomic energy, (10) Foreign affairs, (11) Diplomatic and consular representation, (12) United Nations Organisation, (16) Foreign jurisdiction, (37) Foreign loans and (41) Trade and Commerce with foreign countries.⁶ The Legislature also enjoys deliberative controls on the formulation and implementation of the Executive’s foreign policy by means of questions, resolutions, motions and debates on the floor of the house and through Consultative Committees. As a last resort, Parliament can even withhold appropriation of grants to the MEA if dissatisfied with its handling of international affairs.

Arjun Appadorai was the first to systematically investigate the impact of domestic political structure on Indian foreign policy. He concluded that “the influence of Parliament (and parties) on foreign policy was but marginal” during the first quarter century of India’s sovereign existence, despite the plethora of constitutional provisions to the contrary.⁷ While this fit the age of single-party (Congress) dominance, it does not apply to the intensely competitive, kaleidoscopic and coalition-prone political ambience in which the BJP has been exercising power over the last three years. It is an indicator of the politicisation of foreign policy that the BJP went to the hustings in 1998 highlighting its vow to “re-evaluate the country’s nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons” and painting its opponents as timorous and unpatriotic for “bending under pressure” to neighbouring countries and big powers.⁸ Foreign policy may still be an elite preoccupation, but it has certainly entered the electoral and public domain and appealed to amenable constituencies as never before since Indira Gandhi’s heyday. While the objective of this analysis is to unravel the myth of a BJP alternative to the Nehruvian framework, this analysis proceeds within a context of increasing references to foreign policy in domestic political discourse and the burgeoning impact of the latter on the former.

Part one of this study delineates the components of Nehru's foreign policy doctrine, stressing the specific stamp of historical circumstances and the personality of his leadership. Part two demystifies the BJP's "realist alternative" to Nehru's model by elucidating the party's ideological bedrocks. These will be juxtaposed to three trumpeted *tour de forces* of the Foreign Office since 1998: (1) Pokhran II (nuclear tests and defence); (2) "bus diplomacy" and the Kargil war (Pakistan policy); and (3) the turnaround in Indo-US relations (post-Cold War alignment). In each of the three case studies, the inescapability of the Nehruvian idiom and vision and the weightiness of continuity in change will be posited. I argue that there is a classic, undying and timeless core in Indian foreign policy bequeathed by Nehru, which not even an instinctively anti-Nehruvian political phenomenon like BJP is able to disregard. This thesis departs from current English-language media and scholarly commentary that suggests that the BJP has brought about a revolution in India's foreign policy, totally disowning the Nehru legacy.⁹ The accumulated consensus and naturalness that Nehru's vision has given to India's external relations is visible through all important international decisions taken by the BJP in the last four years.

His Own Foreign Minister

Prime Minister Nehru contemplated resignation from public office four times under work pressure, and legend has it that on each occasion he desisted due to visceral attachment to his "additional responsibility" – the post of Foreign Minister – and the fervent belief that he alone could steer India to its destined international status. This assumption of indispensability in external relations sprang from Nehru's undisputed monopoly over Congressional stances toward overseas issues before independence and the absence of contenders with his kind of "broad world perspective."¹⁰ Gandhi, Nehru's mentor and "Great Master," acknowledged how his pupil "had made us accustomed to looking at everything in the international light instead of the parochial,"¹¹ and the Congress High Command was equally happy to humour Nehru's "pet interest."

When a multi-party Interim Government was inaugurated in September 1946 as a transitory arrangement overseeing the handover of power from British to Indian hands, Vice-President Nehru set about carving the template of free India's foreign policy. He met no resistance in what was otherwise a highly fractious amalgamation of disagreeing political entities. A non-existent Foreign Service bureaucracy further embossed Nehru's status as philosopher, architect and sole spokesman of Indian foreign policy. Such was the over-personalisation of decision-making that South Block (the MEA headquarters in New Delhi) was gripped by a "leave it to *Panditji* syndrome" in the Nehru era.¹²

Myriad patronising notes and memoranda to Ambassadors and envoys enjoining dos and don'ts on topics ranging from nitty-gritty protocol to crucial defining precepts bear testimony to the extent of Nehru's personal supervision and tutoring of every nicety of Indian foreign policy.¹³ As his own foreign minister, Nehru the democrat nearly epitomised his much-dreaded spectres of "Caesarism" and dictatorial behaviour by turning the Cabinet into a rubber stamp on important international questions, and jettisoning the principle of Collective Responsibility.¹⁴

Thus, the roots of Indian foreign policy collapse into the intellectual fountainheads of the Nehruvian tradition.

The Nehruvian Framework

Nehru's worldview was a product of "the conditioning I have had in my life" as well as Indian geography and culture, "but the principal factor [was] the Indian national movement with Gandhi as its leader."¹⁵ Though a recalcitrant follower of Gandhian *Satyagraha* during the freedom struggle, Nehru was keen on adapting the Great Master's teachings to international relations. Gandhi's unique non-violent nationalism had mobilised millions, triumphed over the world's greatest empire, and left no trace of bitterness in India's former colonial master, ultimate proof that the Gandhian technique and ethic was eminently suitable and applicable to free India's external affairs.

"Our cause becomes a world cause," according to Nehru, only when the Mahatma's prescriptions for India are carried over to humanity.¹⁶ All of Nehru's salient foreign policy tenets – non-alignment, *Panchsheel*, anti-colonialism, disarmament and One World – were premised upon two central Gandhian paradigms of *tolerance* and *means justifying ends*. Nehru reiterated in foreign policy pronouncements that India was "essentially a gentle and peace-loving country" and hence incapable of aggressive power-political actions.¹⁷

Bloc rivalries and Cold Wars were inedible to the Indian psyche since they cultivated hatred and demonised one half of the world as sub-human and evil. India would crusade against arms races and nuclear proliferation as they were manifestations of a "crisis of spirit" negating the dignity of human life and "a strange way to ensure security by adding to every conceivable danger."¹⁸ Instead of inaugurating a "new civilisation" based on tolerance and international co-operation after two devastating wars, the Superpowers had betrayed the peoples of the world by continuing to deal in *realpolitik* terms. Realists like McKinder, Spykman and Lippmann were "supremely foolish" for institutionalising the Cold War in epistemology and saluting power as an end of international relations.¹⁹ An inexorable "logic of the age" demanded that the end should be people and the only justifiable means should be peace.²⁰ India would set an example by not only facing the right ends in view but also, true to Gandhian values, "adopting the right means and the right methods."²¹

Like many other third world statesmen of his time, Nehru's abhorrence for war, conflict and conquest were also products of the tumultuous environment in which he grew up and the historical lessons he internalised as an avid watcher of unfolding international crises. His was the so-called "enlightenment generation" that lived through two devastating world wars, both of which were caused by paranoid alliance systems and balance of power calculations. He travelled extensively in Europe and the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and early 1930s, participating in the International Anti-Imperialist League in Brussels as well as organising Indian Congress assistance to the Republicans in the anti-Franco Spanish Civil War.

In a 1927 report, Nehru declared that India must be linked to the wider anti-imperialist struggle going on in the world and that "we must understand world movements and policies, and fashion our movement accordingly."²² West European

dilemmas about choosing between the “lesser evil” – communism or Nazism – did not trouble him because he had seen that the former was not as abominable as was being made out to be and that the latter was indeed evil. Nehru’s equi-distancing between America and the USSR was evident in correspondence from the inter-war years, when he predicted that both held lessons for India, and that both were capable of developing, in the long-run, a “kind of imperialism.”²³ That India must cull the best out of each and reject the excesses of pure capitalism and communism seemed the most pragmatic tactic, although Jana Singh critics like Balraj Madhok would later lambast this view in parliament as Utopian.

Nehru meticulously distinguished pacifism/utopianism from his “practical idealism.” The former was negative and platitudinous, but the latter stood for application of enlightened self-interest to particular foreign policy contexts. On India’s initiative, the Disarmament Sub-Committee of the UN came into being in 1953, and it was India that first proposed a worldwide suspension of nuclear tests in 1957. Non-proliferation preserved “ultimate good” but was also essential to prevent India’s planning and economic development from “going to pieces because the whole world goes to pieces.”²⁴

Non-alignment not only laid the foundation of One World but also kept open doors for economic and military assistance from both East and West to poverty-stricken and defenceless India.²⁵ Detaching governments from people, Nehruvian India strove to improve relations with difficult neighbours Pakistan and China, “because though their governments may not do so, the people will always grasp an outstretched hand.”²⁶ Nehru’s uncanny ability to “strike a balance between national development and international development,”²⁷ between unit-level goals and larger normative system-level concerns, and between national good and ultimate good was an onerous legacy and challenge for successors. Prime Minister Vajpayee chose to perorate a major goal-delimiting address in 1998 with Nehru’s aphorism, “nationalism and internationalism are the two eyes of our national body.”²⁸

The Nehruvian Worldview After Nehru

Indira Gandhi’s foreign policy shared many of Nehru’s assumptions about the civilizational and moral greatness of India, the necessity to remain wary of western neo-colonialism, the imperative of championing decolonisation in Africa and Latin America, and about the benefits of a highly protected mixed economy. But the 1962 Indian military defeat by China and domestic political turbulence caused a transformation in attitudes on the use of force such that Indira Gandhi projected a symbolic militancy and toughness. For a brief period before the 1971 Bangladesh war, it appeared as if Nehruvian non-alignment, too, was being shown the door courtesy of the Indo-Soviet Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, but as the 1970s wore on, India once again reverted to the previous stance. Such was the resilience of Nehruvian consensus in not deviating too far in either direction in the Cold War that Indira Gandhi, after initial reluctance, openly condemned the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan during her second term (1980-1984). A similar pattern of deviation and return took place in the nuclear field, with the 1974 “Peaceful Nuclear Explosion” (again largely motivated by domestic politics) being followed

by Morarji Desai's "no tests ever" diktat. Indira Gandhi showed little interest during her second term for further testing despite leaps in atomic science capability.

Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989) signalled a complete throwback to Nehruvian posturing by proposing a much-touted "Action Plan" at the United Nations for phased elimination of all nuclear weapons. At the same time, regional tensions with Pakistan and growing signs of Pakistan-abetted militancy in Kashmir led to an unprecedented peacetime military build-up in 1987 (Operation Brasstacks), and Rajiv Gandhi also burnt his fingers intervening in Sri Lanka. Thus, the post-Nehruvian Congress era witnessed many seesawing foreign policies calibrated to changing times although the Nehruvian essence was retained. Stephen Cohen has termed this tendency "militant Nehruvianism."²⁹

In the first half of the 1990s, far-reaching economic liberalization policies swept India and opened it to the world market, leaving only trappings of Nehru's welfare state. The end of the Cold War also obviated many global circumstances that informed the Nehruvian foreign policy framework. India plunged into a morass of political instability and uncertainty, with record-breaking government turnover between 1989 and 1998. It is in this indeterminate and chaotic interlude that the BJP's political and foreign policy challenge to the Congress system emerged.

Ideological Wellsprings of BJP Foreign Policy

The BJP locates its philosophical moorings in cultural nationalism or *Hindutva* and fashions its worldview with the implements of this tradition.³⁰ Simply stated, *Hindutva* is a quest for rediscovering India's Hindu genius and restoring the nation to its superior ancient Hindu glory.³¹ The Indian nation can only measure up to its Vedic golden age when assertive Hindu consciousness, cultural pride and order replace the "softness" of anglicised constructions like Nehru's "pseudo-secularism."³² The BJP dream of gaining for India global recognition and a rightful place among the leading powers requires supplanting Gandhi-Nehru effeminate and non-violent essentialisms with images of Hindu masculinity and martial-endowments. M.S. Golwalkar, the founding guru of BJP's parent body RSS, ridiculed India's description as a land of *ahimsa* (non-violence) since "every Hindu god is armed."³³ Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh blamed the "ersatz pacifism" of Buddhist, Jain, Vaishnav-Bhakti and Gandhian views for "twisting India's strategic culture into all kinds of absurdities" and enfeebling a once fierce nation.³⁴ The argument goes that one has only to peruse core ancient Indian treatises, *Arthashastra* and *Mahabharata*, to glean the "essence of the Indian military mind" which enabled Hindu kings to extend their sways as far as Central and Southeast Asia.³⁵ For ideologue K.N. Govindacharya, forging a Hindu India "embracing *Kshatriya/Shakti* [warrior] tradition of revolutionaries instead of the timorous Brahminical *Bhakti* [devotional] tradition" is the main psychological makeover for BJP foreign policy.³⁶

The BJP's discursive analysts make repeated allusions to Indian weakness, insecurity, marginalisation and lack of power in a globalising world. Nehru's accomplishments were "punching above his height" with excessive moral hectoring and not building India's "real strength."³⁷ Pusillanimous foreign policies of Nehru's successors ensured that "India is today at the bottom of the international pile" and

not the master of its own destiny.³⁸ The BJP's inaugural foreign policy document opened, "never before has India faced such external threats as are now looming."³⁹ Over the years, a plethora of warnings about besieged Indian territorial integrity and the receding Indian role in world affairs (until cathartic Pokhran II) have ensued.⁴⁰

This barrage of lament about India "reaching rock-bottom in world stature" and BJP as "an alternative to a better end," appeals to and has been internalised by ex-servicemen, business executives and former bureaucrats, enabling BJP to transcend its social base of traditional trading castes in the 1990s.⁴¹ Party pledges of a "strong India" recognised as an "autonomous power center in the world"⁴² and aggressive defence of India's frontiers combine to attract an expectant post-economic liberalization upper middle class. Studies concluding an "inconsequential connection" between foreign policy and elections⁴³ are vindicated neither by Indira Gandhi's thumping post-Bangladesh victory (1972) nor by BJP encashing its "defender of national interests" image after Pokhran II and Kargil in the successful 1999 poll.

The "Hindu Bomb": BJP's Finest Hour

"Operation Shakti" (Pokhran II) is rightfully regarded within BJP ranks as their moment in history. "Synthesising the tenets of political realism and the moral mission of the party," the BJP marks the anniversary of the explosions as "resurgent India day."⁴⁴

This is political realism, certainly, but to what extent is nuclearisation an expression of the party's "strength respects strength" foreign policy? The BJP's *a priori* linkage between the bomb and national vitality leaves little doubt that strength is visualised primarily in terms of "hard strength" (military might).⁴⁵ Jana Krishnamurthy, current party President, believes "nuclear weapons will give us prestige, power, standing" and foreclose India from being "blackmailed and treated as oriental blackies" by the Western world. All the weakness, vulnerability, "lack" and effeminacy of the past are behind India after Pokhran, according to the Foreign Minister, with a "transformation from the moralistic to the realistic" and India's self-centered pursuit of strength.⁴⁶ A pro-BJP news-editor has gone so far as to say, "India has arrived on the threshold of superpower status, literally with a bang."⁴⁷ The Prime Minister concedes, "India has never considered military might as the ultimate measure of national strength," but adds, "it's a necessary component of national strength" that will earn the respect of the world.⁴⁸

Worldwide condemnation and economic sanctions after India went nuclear hardly measure up to "respect," but subsequent damage control of the event's fall-outs are claimed by the party as evidence of successfully pursuing *Realpolitik* and radically redefining India's foreign policy.⁴⁹ MEA officials point also to fortunate developments such as the non-ratification of the CTBT by the US Congress and the Republican victory in the 2000 US presidential election that blunted the edge of international outrage. The most crucial factor mitigating international condemnation has been worldwide acceptance of India's claim that its nuclear policy has no aggressive intent.⁵⁰

Nuclear India and Nehru's Ghost

Despite, and in reaction to, criticism that nuclear India has joined the club of proliferationists and forfeited the moral high ground conferred by Nehruvian disarmament initiatives, the idealistic language of Nehru continues to inform official Indian discourse and multilateral diplomacy on the nuclear issue. Nehru's vision of a complete, verifiable and non-discriminatory abolition of nuclear weapons and elimination of bomb-making capabilities is now advanced ever more frequently by the MEA in defence against accusations that India has overturned the non-proliferation appellation. India did not sign the fundamentally asymmetrical, discriminatory and hegemonistic NPT and CTBT, both of which fail to address the larger global need of reversing the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by the Permanent Five. Without concomitant "unproliferation" by all possessors of nuclear stockpiles, India cannot be expected to meekly comply with "nuclear apartheid," ignore its pressing security concerns and eschew independence.⁵¹

Rooted in *universal* disarmament and *comprehensive* test bans, India's post-1998 nuclear posturing departs little from the idealism, obstinate defiance and independent action of the Nehruvian tradition.⁵² Vajpayee parrots Nehru in maintaining, "India has always stood for global nuclear disarmament" and "if other countries decide to destroy their nuclear arsenals, we are also prepared to do so."⁵³ India remains the only nuclear-weapons-state advocating the complete abolition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It also insists on "no first use" of nuclear weapons, stressing that the bomb would only be employed in retaliation for nuclear attack. Nehru, hoping for the peaceful use of atomic energy, had nonetheless warned, "If India is threatened [by nuclear war] she will inevitably try to defend herself by *all means at her disposal*."⁵⁴ Vajpayee echoes this, "India will never use the nuclear option for destruction," but only "for the country's protection and safeguarding its territorial integrity" in view of a deteriorating security environment.⁵⁵ India's "Draft Nuclear Doctrine" has declared a moratorium on further testing, a "credible minimum deterrent" limiting the size of the nuclear arsenal, stringent export controls on nuclear and missile technology, and moderation in disseminating nuclear-war-fighting doctrines to combat units. The Prime Minister summarised this curious amalgam of Nehruvian idealism and realism at the UN Millennium Summit: "India was forced to acquire these weapons" but based its security and foreign policy on "responsibility and restraint."⁵⁶ Nehru lives, in that the Vajpayee government's nuclear doctrine is "morally befitting and worthy of India's civilizational heritage" besides being "operationally sound strategy."⁵⁷ The challenge to future statecraft, according to the Foreign Minister, is also Nehruvian: "How to find an equilibrium between India's own perceptions of its national security and just and valid international concerns about WMD."⁵⁸

Unfulfilled Strategic Culture

For BJP's realist interlocutors, next in magnitude to nuclear deliverance is the induction of a "national strategic culture." To Jaswant Singh this means "formulating and executing national will" on warfare, security realities and defence and integrating it into foreign policy.⁵⁹ For security pundit K. Subrahmanyam this involves

preparing psychologically the foreign policy bureaucracy, the military, coalition partners, opposition parties and the rest of the country to face strategic scenarios through debates, discussions, overhauls and long-range intelligence assessments.

The party variously refers to a policy of “defence diplomacy, coupled with adequate preparedness of our armed forces,” “reviewing the security environment to cover all aspects of defence requirement and organisation,” and “institutionalisation of forward planning.”⁶⁰ Towards these ends, Vajpayee established a National Security Council in April 1999 “to analyse the military, economic and political threats to the nation and render continuous advise to the government.”⁶¹ Two new offices have been created – Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) – to integrate weapons acquisition, logistics and strategy, hitherto performed compartmentally by the Chiefs of Army, Navy and Air Force. Pursuant to the BJP mantra of “security first and the rest will follow,”⁶² a massive military modernization drive is underway with party claims of “the largest ever increase in defence budget.”⁶³ In Advani’s words, a “comprehensive systemic overhaul to meet security challenges of the 21st century” is being carried out for the first time in independent India’s history.⁶⁴

Impressive as these may sound on paper, in practice India’s strategic culture has improved little during BJP rule. NSC exists as a vestigial organ and rarely meets; instead the old Nehruvian Cabinet Committee on Defence/National Security still serves as adviser to the government for long-range threat assessments. CDS also has run into inter-services rivalry, particularly concerning control of the nuclear arsenal, and is yet to become operational. CDS also faces the ire of Defence Ministry bureaucrats who see the government’s “pro-services changes” as detrimental to their privileges.⁶⁵ Further, minuscule defence budget increases in the first two years of Vajpayee’s governance “appear to have gone for enhancement of manpower costs (salaries and pensions)” and not toward capital inventory.⁶⁶ The 2000-2001 record defence budget came as a knee-jerk reaction to exposure of gross inadequacies in equipment, resources, and provisioning, and critical failures in military intelligence and aerial surveillance during the May-July 1999 Kargil War with Pakistan. Defence expenditures need to be viewed against the backdrop of Kargil rather than as the advent of a new strategic consciousness.⁶⁷

BJP and Indo-Pak Relations: Love-Hate Thy Neighbour

Vajpayee’s dramatic Lahore bus ride for a summit with Pakistan’s Nawaz Sharif in February 1999 was the first visit by an Indian head-of-government to its most nettlesome neighbour since Nehru’s visit forty years before. When Vajpayee was the Janata Foreign Minister in the late 1970s, India’s neighbourhood diplomacy garnered an unprecedented degree of goodwill causing Vajpayee to declare “a new era of understanding and friendship” between India and Pakistan.⁶⁸ Between 1977 and 1979, agreements on trade expansion, water sharing, transportation, telecommunications and cultural exchange were topped by Indian support for Pakistan’s readmission to the Commonwealth and entry into the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Kashmir, however, remained intractable in Janata times, but by instituting a climate of trust and continuing dialogue Vajpayee showed he was capable of

charting a new course. Lahore “bus diplomacy” and succeeding overtures clearly pick up these threads from the past and demonstrates Vajpayee’s personal optimism about putting half a century of mutual bitterness behind.

The Prime Minister’s conciliatory vibes do not settle comfortably into the rubric of his party’s Pakistan policy. BJS was founded in 1951 with the express aim of reversing Partition, an “artificial by-product” of Congressional appeasement and lust for power, and reverting to *Akhand Bharat* (Undivided India). Although qualified by assurances that reunification of the subcontinent was not sought through violence and that they “would wait for the people of Pakistan to realise their mistake,”⁶⁹ the party’s inveterate opposition to the legitimacy and existence of Pakistan triggered alarm and trepidation across the border. Vajpayee chose to assuage Pakistani concerns in this regard by declaring in 1978 that, “India would rejoice in the progress and prosperity of Pakistan.” *Akhand Bharat* was subsequently downgraded as a goal, but 1990s *Sangh Parivar* jingoism and “Hindu fundamentalism” inspired scarce confidence in Islamic Pakistan, which anticipated a steep downturn in Indo-Pak relations with BJP ascent. Vajpayee’s *déjà vu* reassurance on assuming power, that “a stable, prosperous and secure Pakistan is in India’s interest,”⁷⁰ and his relentless peace initiatives have tended to dispel some Pakistani misgivings, but further suggest a chasm between his party’s thinking and his own. Rising incidence of Pakistan-sponsored militant secessionism in Kashmir may widen this subterranean gulf.

Hot Pursuit, POK Redemption and Territorialism

Since 1989, the bloody Kashmir insurgency has been India’s principal internal security threat and barometer of relations with Pakistan. When the BJP was the opposition party, it advocated uncompromising and vigorous counter-insurgency against Pakistan’s proxy war, haranguing governments for “namby-pamby attitudes” and promising “adequate responses” to end the menace if voted into office.⁷¹ Shortly after the nuclear tests, India announced a policy of “hot pursuit” of terrorists into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), a measure favoured by the army but avoided by previous governments for fear of provoking all-out war. The BJP adduced justification from international law for the right to strike at militant training camps in *de facto* Pakistani territory and drew comparisons with the 1998 American airstrikes against suspected Osama bin Laden bases in Afghanistan and Sudan.⁷² Hot pursuit is not only an offensive “final solution” to curb militancy but also “the first step toward the unfinished task of reunifying Kashmir,”⁷³ an idea enjoying multi-partisan support in the Indian polity but one that finds maximum exhortation in BJP utterances. BJP territorialism has become all the more belligerent and Kashmir-focused after “Kargil inflation” boosted its reputation as patriotic defender of territory and propelled it back to power in the 1999 interim election.⁷⁴ Highlighting Kargil as the only war in which land was not lost thanks to “realist assessment of the field of battle” and ordering air strikes to repel invaders unlike Nehru in 1962, BJP pitched the scales higher in its traditionally anti-Pakistan demeanour.

The net effect of BJP stridency on Pakistan is to complicate and encumber the Prime Minister’s endeavours for seeking a political solution on Kashmir. Having denounced Congress Prime Ministers for “continuing farcical meetings” with

Islamabad in spite of the latter's abetment of infiltration and terrorism in Kashmir, the mood is now no different beneath the surface. "Kargil produced a certain mindset among the party cadres and nothing has happened since then to change that mindset," complain insiders questioning the rationale for probing diplomatic settlements with an incorrigible foe.⁷⁵ Indeed, Indian intelligence estimates that "Nawaz Sharif was fully in the picture" on the plan to intrude into Kargil even before ink on the Lahore Declaration was dry.⁷⁶ Kargil was a violation of the Lahore pledge of refraining from "intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs."

According to BJP leaders, unilateral ceasefires against militants and "Pakistani mercenaries" are signs of weakness and softness before a duplicitous adversary and "difficult for [the BJP] cadre to swallow."⁷⁷ General Secretary Narendra Modi feels "defensive steps will neither protect innocent people nor bring about a change of heart among terrorists" and that the time has come to pay Pakistan back in its own language.⁷⁸ There is little wonder, then, that BJP (and not the opposition) demanded that "cross-border terrorism, proxy war and ISI involvement in the valley should also be treated as core issues" of the dispute with Pakistan, along with the future status of Kashmir at the July 2001 Agra Summit between Vajpayee and the architect of Kargil, General Musharraf.⁷⁹ Notwithstanding MEA rebuttal of Pakistani allegations that BJP hawks sabotaged the Summit, party lionization of Advani as "the hero of Agra" who "prevented 'them' from selling our country to Pakistan" suggests a total divorce between Vajpayee's priorities and the *Sangh Parivar's*.⁸⁰

The December 2001 terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament have further widened the rift between the kernel of the party and moderate elements within the government. BJP rank-and-file feel that their past remonstrations to the Prime Minister not to negotiate with Pakistan have been vindicated with "yet another betrayal."⁸¹ Yet, having raised the bar of expectations on foreign and defence policy sky-high, the party is now faced with the possibility of public cynicism that BJP has become "Congressised." Calls for a declaration of war on Pakistan for complicity in the December 13 attacks, drawing parallels with America's war on the Taliban after September 11, have been emanating regularly from the RSS, while Vajpayee has adopted a more mellow tone while warning that India's "patience is running out." His position is that India will "go more than half the way to meet Pakistan" if there are credible reductions in infiltrations into Kashmir and an end to *jihad*. The biggest troop massing on the Pakistan border in 15 years, viewed by many as coercive diplomacy similar to Nehru's in 1951, is "not to wage war but for defence," according to Vajpayee.⁸² The party has meanwhile kept up its hot pursuit and "attack is the best defence" chant, and it remains to be seen how this party-government chasm might develop if and when Vajpayee embarks on a new peace initiative with General Musharraf. The gravity of recent incidents of terrorism in Kashmir and the dare-devilry with which the country's most sacred democratic institution has been attacked might mean that, for the foreseeable future, the party's line of "no compromise with terrorists" will prevail. But beyond this, no other "proactive solution" (the euphemism for military strikes on terrorist camps in POK) is likely to be pursued.

Second Nehru and Attractions of Peacemaking

Why does Vajpayee persist with diplomacy in the teeth of seething disapprobation from his Alma Mater? Bal Thackeray, a gadfly alliance partner of the BJP, has quipped, “Vajpayee’s ambition to be India’s second Nehru will cost us dearly.”⁸³ Irony aside, Vajpayee is a great admirer of Nehru and admits to having a Nehruvian streak. Whenever Vajpayee reminds detractors that India has been striving for peace with its neighbour “from the time of Jawaharlal Nehru,” it is to confirm continuity and inspiration in his own foreign policy.

Fifty years ago, Nehru laid out a profound yet simple set of permutations for the future of India-Pakistan relations, “we can be either rather hostile to each other or very friendly with each other.”⁸⁴ Vajpayee subscribes to this black and white theory and believes in “not traversing solely on the beaten track of the past,” which never moved beyond the first possibility, and exploring diplomatic means for a “lasting solution to the Kashmir problem” to realise the second possibility.⁸⁵ The latter direction is infinitely more desirable to Vajpayee. He adheres to Nehru’s humanist school of thought that bifurcates governments from people. In 1978, he felt “convinced that *the people* of our two countries want to see peaceful and good neighbourly relations,” and acknowledged how “*our people* have brought home to me. . . that they do not accept as inevitable the grim alternative of confrontation and conflict.”⁸⁶ In 2001, he is motivated by the same spirit, “we know that the *people* of Pakistan yearn for peace with India” and instead of wars the two should be fighting common problems of poverty, unemployment and backwardness.⁸⁷ Plugging the heavy drain of resources incurred by mutual hostilities and diverting them into developmental channels for their respective populations was the cornerstone of Nehru’s *Weltanschauung*; Vajpayee accepts this as the goal “we owe to ourselves and to future generations.” The humanitarian angle of the Prime Minister’s Pakistan policy is also bolstered by his conviction since BJS days that “although the states have separated the people are one,” a diluted variant of *Akhand Bharat*.⁸⁸

Apart from Vajpayee’s personal affinity for the Nehruvian tradition, there are practical considerations propelling the government to sustain dialogue with Islamabad. Some regular back-channel meetings between Niaz Naik, former Pakistani Foreign Secretary, and R.K. Mishra, a Vajpayee confidante, from February to July 1999, are widely believed to have arrived “tantalisingly close” to a secret deal that “would have resulted in a resolution of the Kashmir dispute by October,” had it not been for the Kargil stand-off.⁸⁹ Unobtrusive “Track II diplomacy” after Lahore clinched an agreement to “find an expeditious solution to the Kashmir dispute within a specified time-frame,” a sensational revelation vouchsafed for among others by the Pakistani ambassador to the US, Maleeha Lodhi, and influential strategist, Zaqar Iqbal Cheema.⁹⁰ The experience of nearing a major breakthrough undoubtedly encourages the Indian side to explore negotiated settlement and launch round after round of multi-layered talks.

Another factor driving Indian diplomacy is Vajpayee’s dual desires to develop India’s post-Pokhran image as a responsible power capable of managing nuclear weapons and to soothe western angst about Kashmir turning into a nuclear flash-point. That there is an American hand in the composite dialogue process is an open

secret.⁹¹ Peacemaking as an occupation is a privilege of great powers and nuclear India is keen on gaining recognition and appreciation from Washington by emulating the latter's etiquette. In an ambience of growing commonality of interests, India stands to win praise from the United States for taking unilateral initiatives to resolve the Kashmir tangle.

BJP and the Eagle's Embrace: A "Natural Alliance"

Amidst earth-shaking changes to world power equations in 1991, the BJP was the only party to state that the, "non-alignment movement, created against the backdrop of a bipolar world has lost its relevance."⁹² Since the early 1960s, BJS (the precursor to the BJP) had rallied against non-alignment, arguing that it hindered alliances on the basis of reciprocity and national interest and was "an essentially static way of looking at the world." As Indira Gandhi veered into the Soviet orbit in the 1970s, the BJS promoted a barely disguised pro-American stance, convinced that Indo-Soviet friendship was an instrument for the perpetuation of Congressional rule and an extension of Muscovite totalitarianism to Delhi. The "genuine non-alignment"/ "alignment with all" policy adopted during the Janata interlude was meant as a corrective to the pro-Soviet tilt of Congress regimes, and began an unprecedented *bonhomie* with Washington.

Between 1977 and 1979, US economic assistance was resumed after a seven-year suspension and bilateral trade flows improved. For the first and only time during the Cold War, America openly affirmed "no inherent contradiction between the roles of the United States and India" in geo-strategic terms.⁹³ Even traditional ally Pakistan was for once sidelined by a US declaration that it "looked to India as the leader in South Asia." Then-President Jimmy Carter emphasized this different relationship with India in a state visit that did not include a corresponding stop in Islamabad. Beyond an exterior expression of warmth, however, Indo-US ties remained "thin below the levels of broad principle" with a host of rankling hurdles from non-proliferation to India's insular foreign investment regime.⁹⁴

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and Indira Gandhi's return to power in 1980 returned India to the *status quo ante* with India's "true friend," the USSR. Nevertheless, the overall pro-American stance and impatience for alignments demonstrated by the BJS inform our present analysis of BJP-US relations.

Émigrés and Economics: Undergirding Cement

A major factor explaining India's enhanced value in American eyes in the last decade has been the growing political activism of non-resident Indians (NRIs) in the US. A high proportion of the 1.7 million strong Indian immigrant community are "new economy" professionals, eulogised by President Bush as "the world's most skilled workers," hailing from urban middle and upper-class backgrounds, and enjoying access to decision-making circles in India. The BJP has always been the natural choice of the Indian white-collar Diaspora; the *Sangh Parivar* has been the perennial champion of the overseas Indians, espousing the motto, "Mother India has not only *not* forgotten them, she loves them even better than children at home."⁹⁵

In sharp contrast to Nehru's indifference for Indian expatriates, the BJS placed emotional allegiance above legal citizenship and accused Congress governments of abandoning sons of the soil. "An Indian is an Indian, wherever he is," thundered the party mouthpiece in 1964, and the same ethos imbues Vajpayee's present-day beckoning to NRIs as "all children of Mother India."⁹⁶

The Vajpayee government's special incentives for NRIs – PIO cards, automatic approval of foreign direct investment, easing of foreign exchange controls and import duties, deputation of a "Special Envoy" on NRI affairs in the US, granting of dual citizenship, etc. – further crystallise the relationship of expatriates with BJP. The party's solid network of loyal elite Indian-American supporters pays dividends not only through an increase in campaign financing and "soft money" from abroad, but also through a well connected pro-India lobby in the nerve centers of American polity, from the White House to Capitol Hill. "New Jews" by self-description, NRIs constitute a new and undeniably energetic agency for Indo-US friendship by "building bridges between successive administrations and the BJP government"⁹⁷ and fashioning closer bonds with American civil society that were found lacking in the past.

Economic liberalization since 1991 and attendant sea changes in Indian trade and investment policy are also attracting American investments in what is technically termed a Big Emerging Market (BEM). Unmistakable signals to this effect were conveyed when CEOs outnumbered diplomats in Bill Clinton's presidential entourage in March 2000, during which a "US-India Commercial Dialogue" was begun. America has always been India's single largest trading partner and source of investment and technology, but Delhi's decade-long replacement of inward-oriented import substitution with freer trade and de-regulated FDI is radically buttressing this circumstance.

The full potential of Indo-US economic exchange, however, remains thoroughly under-realised when compared to America's interaction with BEMs such as China, South Korea, Argentina and Brazil. High tariffs in India's consumer goods sector and non-tariff barriers and "tariff peaks" on Indian textile and agrarian exports at the other end are lingering irritants that result in dampened levels of American FDI and technology transfer. More pertinent here, India's political class is yet to emerge from instinctive anti-colonialism and habitual fear of "economic neo-imperialism." In spite of BJP's identification with traders and "big business," there is a deep dichotomy within party ranks over the contrasting choices of *Swadeshi* (self-reliance) economics and liberalization. It is a rift so potent that the Prime Minister has often times threatened resignation if outspoken *Sangh Parivar* critics are not reined in. The upshot is an acute asymmetry in Indo-US trade and investment ties, whereby India is a marginal partner in overall American foreign economic policy, but America is India's most valuable partner. "The onus of adjustment, therefore, lies more with India."⁹⁸

Strategic Divergence and Convergence

The new post-Cold War strategic and geopolitical bases to warming Indo-US relations are complex and problematic to verify. The success of a strategic accord rests

significantly on the measure of agreement between Delhi and Washington on nuclear non-proliferation. Pokhran drew instant condemnation and sanctions from the Clinton administration and threatened to jeopardise the new socio-economic currents slowly drawing the two countries closer. In the pre-1998 phase, America was interested in promoting greater regional stability in South Asia as an incentive to prevent India from going overtly nuclear. After *Shakti* and Pakistan's nuclear tests, US policy shifted to capping an arms race by getting both countries to unconditionally sign the CTBT and to halt weaponization and theatre deployment.

The possibility of a "deal" on CTBT was hinted at after Jaswant Singh, perhaps the staunchest pro-American Foreign Minister ever, met Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott over ten rounds of negotiations and promised accession to the treaty provided there was national consensus. National consensus, however, might be difficult to achieve because of the accumulated domestic political antipathy to the CTBT, particularly among Congress and left parties. Some strategic experts are also doubtful about the CTBT because the ambiguously defined "credible minimum deterrent" may not be reachable by mere computerized simulation.

American domestic political change has eased this dilemma for India in some sense, as demonstrated in the Bush Administration's de-emphasising of arms control as the sole determinant of good relations. Yet, Secretary of State Colin Powell's unequivocal "we have to constrain their [India's] nuclear programme,"⁹⁹ and the appointment of a non-proliferation expert, Robert Blackwill, as new American ambassador to India convey that nuclear anxieties are not totally off the horizon. On the question of weaponization, a *modus vivendi* was sounded when the Bush administration advised against induction of India's nuclear-payload capable IRBM, *Agni*, but "understood" the need for its further testing. The onus has apparently moved away from American efforts to limit Indian weaponization to what National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice calls an entente founded on "shared perceptions of the role of defences in nuclear deterrence."¹⁰⁰ Yet, MEA and the Indian security establishment are watchful of any adverse consequences on the South Asian security calculus of a wanton Chinese abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in reaction to America's proposed national missile defence.

The "China factor" is being touted as a major variable spurring Indo-US strategic rapprochement, most animatedly amongst BJP circles. Vajpayee's post-Pokhran explanatory note to Clinton cited India's perception that its main security threat was hostile, nuclear-equipped China. Vajpayee's Asia policy is to encourage America to see India as a democratic, pluralistic and *status quo* alternative and counterweight to authoritarian, aggressive, unpredictable and revisionist China. This ploy is expected to reap dividends in the Bush Administration because of its favoring of conservative anti-China think-tanks like the Heritage Foundation and the CATO Institute. Rapid economic and military strides of China make it a potential superpower and the only force capable of rendering American global hegemony temporary. Washington might play a great geopolitical game of hemming in China and containing its long-term ascent via Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and India. Conversely, the US may continue the last administration's "better off working together" with the dragon approach, recognise it as the unrivalled leader and overseer of Asian security, and

usher in a US-China partnership for “managing” South Asia.¹⁰¹ The US has far greater cultural and economic interests in China than in India and it prizes China, ironically, as a partner in global non-proliferation.

Non-Alignment in a Penumbra World: The Great Nehruvian Rope Trick

Nehru’s superlative legacy to Indian foreign policy, according to diplomatic historian Premen Addy, is “in one word, Russia.”¹⁰² Amidst shadowy and perplexing constellations of world forces, neither the BJP nor other political parties can ignore or jettison the time-tested bonds of trust and predictability Nehru fashioned between Moscow and Delhi while dextrously avoiding too strong an entanglement. The euphoria of an Indo-US love fest notwithstanding, it was Russia that – yesterday and today – understood and supported Indian sensitivities better on critical matters: Kashmir, *jihadi* terrorism, nuclearization, missile development and UN Security Council reform. India-Russia oneness has been borne out vividly after December 13, with Moscow unequivocally condemning Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in Kashmir and affirming “total agreement when India asks Pakistan to do something on the ground to show its sincerity.”¹⁰³ Seen in the larger context of America’s renewed military and economic alliance with Pakistan after September 11, Russia’s continued commitment to India stands out.

The weight of geography and history compel India and Russia to continuously upgrade defence and military co-operation. Nehru had the vision of harnessing the immense scientific, technological and military reservoir of the USSR to meet India’s developmental and defence needs. Russia’s role as principal defence supplier to India suffered disruptions immediately after 1991, but is now back on track with a host of new contracts, joint military exercises and a Strategic Partnership vowing to carry multifaceted ties to higher and qualitatively new levels. Disproving Western under-rating of Russian military-industrial technology, Indo-Russian joint ventures are producing state-of-the-art weaponry like the just-unveiled Brahmos cruise missile (superior to the American Tomahawk). The general outcome of these fruitful enterprises is the ubiquitous feeling that Russia is a dependable ally which rarely complicates or suspects India’s political and military objectives, unlike America, and hence Russia must remain a crucial ally in the twenty-first century. India must learn to befriend Moscow and simultaneously not lose the new momentum with the US. Nehru’s balancing trick of absorbing the best out of all great powers, economic aid from one and military aid from the other, and upholding the independence of Indian foreign policy is still the optimal mantra.

Conclusion

At the dawn of India’s independence, Nehru laid down precepts that were carried out with unquestioning obedience by an MEA of neophytes. Modern-day India – with the advantage of hindsight, the rise of radically anti-Nehruvian political parties like the BJP, and the gradual professionalization of the Foreign Office – is much more critical of the fallacies and deficiencies of the Nehruvian tradition. The gist of this essay is that irrespective of sweeping political changes rendering Nehru irrelevant

in domestic policy, there is an overall continuation and relevance of Nehru's foreign policy as India enters the new millennium. Vajpayee, averring that "no policy can be static, it has to be dynamic," has simultaneously paid tribute to Nehru, "the great architect of our international relations."¹⁰⁴

The BJP as a party spouts the rhetoric of "realpolitik alternative" and "regime replacement" and has benefited from these politically, but in reality, Vajpayee's foreign policy is grounded in essential continuities, especially regarding Pakistan.¹⁰⁵ This takes nothing away from the conclusion that political parties are playing an increasingly contributory role in foreign policy making and as foreign policy opinion generators. But for BJP intervention, India may not have conducted the *Shakti* tests in 1998, and but for BJP predilections and Jaswant Singh's personal initiative, MEA may not have ignored innate prejudices against America. But, from nuclear diplomacy to neighbourhood policy and relations with great powers, Nehruvian spirit endures as an evergreen fulcrum.

NOTES

1. N.M. Ghatate, ed., *Four Decades in Parliament*, Vol. III (Delphi: Shipra Publications, 1996), p. 130.
2. K.R. Narayanan in conversation with N. Ram, Akhbar Internet Magazine. <http://www.ercwilcom.net/~indowindow/akhbar/archives/nehru.htm> (last accessed November 4, 2001).
3. *Panditji* means Brahmin, learned person.
4. Interview with BJP President Bangaru Laxman, New Delhi (September 13, 2000).
5. S. Tharoor, *Political Development and India's Foreign Policy under Indira Gandhi* (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1982), p. 365.
6. *The Constitution of India*, VII Schedule, List I (Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1996), pp. 165-169.
7. Arjun Appadorai, *The Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy 1947-1972* (Delhi: OUP, 1981), p. 78.
8. *BJP Election Manifesto* (Delhi: BJP Office, 1998), pp. 29-31.
9. The left-wing press contends, "not until the BJP gained the levers of power at the Center did a complete reversal of India's foreign policy take place." H.S. Surjeet, "Fifty Fourth Anniversary of Independence," *Ganashakti* (August 14, 2000).
10. M. Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography* (London: OUP, 1959), p. 110. Subhas Bose was equally cognizant of the relevance of Indian freedom struggle to global trends and popularized its anti-imperialist tenor across the world in the 1920s and 1930s. With his marginalization in Congressional ranks though, Nehru took center stage as INC's shadow foreign minister.
11. D.G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi*, Vol. 7 (Mumbai: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1954), p. 90.
12. Diplomat B. Tyabji reminisced how Nehru "liked to do much of his civil servants' work for them." See *Indian Policies and Practices* (Delhi: OUP, 1972), p. 7.
13. Cf. Notes to A. Ali and K.P.S. Menon in S. Gopal, ed., *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, Series 2, Vol. I (Delhi: OUP, 1984), pp. 575-577.
14. His *eminence grise*, Krishna Menon, divulged that "operational matters" needed no discussion in any Cabinet, nor did conceptual matters. M. Brecher, *India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World* (London: OUP, 1968), p. 132.
15. J. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches 1946-1961* (Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961), p. 85.
16. Gopal, *op. cit.*, p. 437.
17. *Jawaharlal Nehru on International Co-operation* (Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1966), p. 69.
18. Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 204.
19. J. Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New York: John Day, 1946), pp. 551-552.

20. Nehru's humanism and World Confederation sentiments presaged Martin Wight's "English School of International Relations," which depicts world politics as nothing but "a realm of human experience."
21. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
22. K.R. Narayanan, "Nehru's Vision of India and the World – Then and Now," Nehru Memorial Lecture (New Delhi, November 13, 1997).
23. *Ibid.*
24. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
25. On September 20, 1946, Nehru could write to Will Clayton requesting foodstuffs and on September 21, he could entreat Molotov for the same. In later decades, India regularly imported wheat from America and Soviet engineers helped develop its heavy industry.
26. Jawaharlal Nehru on *International Co-operation*, *op. cit.*, p. 60.
27. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 517.
28. Cited in M.L. Sondhi, *Vajpayee's Foreign Policy: Daring the Irreversible* (Delhi: Har-Anand, 1999), p. 96.
29. Stephen Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Washington, DC: Brookings Press, 2001), p. 41.
30. The BJP is one in a family of politico-cultural organizations called the *Sangh Parivar*.
31. M. Meghani, "Hindutva: The Great Nationalist Ideology," BJP Website, <http://www.bjp.org/philos.htm> (last accessed November 4, 2001).
32. *Sangh Parivar* luminaries consistently arraign Gandhi, Nehru and their Congress successors for appeasement of minorities. Find a classic indictment in S.P. Mookerjee, *Leaves from a Diary* (Delhi: OUP, 1993), pp. 94-95.
33. K.R. Malkani, *The RSS Story* (Delhi: Impex India, 1980), p. 42.
34. The valour and heroism of Indian warriors of Rajputana, the Vijayanagar Empire, the Maratha Confederacy, Sikhs and Jats of the Indo-Gangetic plains, to name a few from history, are "in spite" of this manipulation. See Jaswant Singh, *Defending India* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 13.
35. G.D. Bakshi, *Mahabharata: A Military Analysis* (Delhi: Lancer International, 1990), p. xix.
36. Interview with K.N. Govindacharya, New Delhi (September 8, 2000).
37. Laxman, Interview, *op. cit.*
38. *Humanistic Approach to Economic Development* (Delhi: BJP Office, 1992), p. 8.
39. A.M. Zaidi, ed., *Annual Register of Indian Political Parties* (Delhi: Institute of Applied Political Research, 1980), p. 690.
40. Typical descriptions are of India "going around the world with a begging bowl" and kow-towing under "heavy pressure to give up legitimate nuclear option." *BJP Foreign Policy Resolutions 1980-1999* (Delhi: BJP Office), pp. 25, 36.
41. C. Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 433-434.
42. *BJP Foreign Policy Resolutions*, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
43. P. S. Ghosh, *BJP and the Evolution of Hindu Nationalism* (Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1999), p. 354.
44. H.K. Nizamani, *Roots of Rhetoric: Politics of Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), p. 64.
45. Sections in BJP accentuate the need to gain "soft strength" through high-tech economic growth and further integration into the world market, but as David Henderson observes, "it is the party of the right, BJP, which has taken more of an anti-reform stance on economic policy." David Henderson, *The Changing Fortunes of Economic Liberalism* (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1998), p. 70.
46. "Hawkish India," *India Today* (June 1, 1998), pp. 10-15.
47. C. Mitra, "Explosion of Self-Esteem," *The Pioneer* (May 12, 1998), p. 1.
48. "Hawkish India," *op. cit.*
49. The US Administration finally lifted sanctions on post-nuclear India in 2001, and this is being brandished as evidence that "the world is taking us more seriously." Laxman, Interview, *op. cit.*
50. Interview with Deputy High Commissioner of India in the UK, Hardeep Puri, London (November 24, 2000).
51. G. Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 7.
52. "We would follow it even if there was no other country in the world that followed it," said Nehru of his foreign policy. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

53. "Vajpayee Proposes a World Free of N-Weapons," *Times of India* (April 6, 2001), electronic version.
54. D. Newman, ed., *Nehru: The First 60 Years*, Vol. 2 (London: Bodley Head, 1965), p. 264.
55. "N-option Only for Protection," *The Hindu* (March 6, 2001), electronic version.
56. Website of the Indian Embassy in Washington, DC, http://www.indianembassy.org/special/cabinet/Primeminister/pm_september_08_2000.htm (last accessed November 4, 2001).
57. G. Kanwal, "India's Nuclear Doctrine and Policy," *Strategic Analysis* (Delhi: Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, February 2001).
58. Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 290.
59. *Ibid.*
60. *BJP Foreign Policy Resolutions*, *op. cit.*, pp. 27, 62, 70.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
62. Right from the days of BJS, the party disagreed with Nehru's classic guns vs. butter dichotomy between defence and economic development and held no price too high for the country's defence.
63. "Vajpayee Government's Achievements," BJP Website, <http://www.bjp.org> (last accessed November 4, 2001).
64. "Government Accepts GoM's Security Overhaul Advice," *The Hindu* (May 23, 2001), p. 1.
65. "India's Military Wings Squabbling for Control of Nuclear button," *Dawn* (May 16, 2001), electronic version; "Jaswant is Defence Minister," *The Hindu* (March 18, 2001), electronic version.
66. Jasjit Singh, *India's Defence Spending* (Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000), p. 44.
67. *Kargil Review Committee Report* (Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), p. 182.
68. A.B. Vajpayee, *New Dimensions of India's Foreign Policy* (Delhi: Vision Books, 1979), p. 191.
69. B.K. Kelkar, *Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya*, Part III (Delhi: BJP Office, 1991), p. 130.
70. Sondhi, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
71. Ghosh, *op. cit.*, p. 344.
72. "BJP MPs for Tough Line on Kashmir," *Free Press Journal* (August 18, 2000), electronic version; "Center Should Not Abandon Hot Pursuit Policy: Naidu," *Daily Excelsior* (August 12, 2001), electronic version.
73. Govindacharya, Interview, *op. cit.*
74. S. Muralidharan, "A Kargil Election?" *Frontline* (September 24, 1999), electronic version.
75. S. Gupta, "BJP Apprehensive of Failed Summit," *Times Of India* (July 13, 2001), electronic version.
76. *Kargil Review Committee Report*, *op. cit.*, p. 226.
77. N. Vyas, "BJP Confident of New Stand on Kashmir," *The Hindu* (November 24, 2000), electronic version.
78. "Respond in Language that Pak Understands," *Times Of India* (August 8, 2001), electronic version.
79. "Opposition Backs PM's Initiative on Talks with Pak," *Daily Excelsior* (July 10, 2001), electronic version.
80. "Advani Turns Tough on Pakistan; PM Soft," *Deccan Chronicle* (August 9, 2001), electronic version; "Sangh Parivar Flays Government," *The Hindu* (May 24, 2001), electronic version.
81. L.K. Advani, "We Shall Not Take Another Betrayal," *Outlook* (January 9, 2002), electronic version.
82. J. Naqvi, "Vajpayee Slams Party Hawks for War Frenzy," *Dawn* (December 20, 2001), electronic version.
83. "Shiv Sena Likely to Quit NDA," *Times Of India* (July 17, 2001), electronic version.
84. Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
85. A.B. Vajpayee, "Time to Resolve Problems of the Past," *The Hindu* (January 2, 2001), electronic version.
86. Vajpayee, *New Dimensions of India's Foreign Policy*, *op. cit.*, p. 192.
87. "Prime Minister Vajpayee's Independence Day Address to the Nation from the Ramparts of Red Fort," 54th Independence Day Address, http://www.indianembassy.org/special/cabinet/Primeminister/pm_id_2001.htm (last accessed November 4, 2001).
88. Ghatate, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
89. "Vajpayee-Sharif 'Deal' Sparks a Controversy," *India Abroad* (September 24, 1999), electronic version.
90. Cheema confides that Musharraf's *coup d'etat* was direct retribution for the deal by which "a civilian Prime Minister was sealing the fate of the military's *raison d'etre*, Kashmir." Interview with Zaqar Iqbal Cheema, Oxford University (November 2, 1999).
91. See M. Joshi, "US Hand Behind Summit Emerges," *TOI* (July 7, 2001), electronic version; K. P. Nayar, "Summit Sneak Preview for US," *Telegraph* (June 19, 2001), electronic version.
92. *BJP Foreign Policy Resolutions*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

93. D. Kux, *Estranged Democracies: India and the United States* (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 1993), p. 362.
94. *Ibid.*
95. *Organiser*, Editorial (May 26, 1968), p. 2.
96. *Organiser*, Editorial (June 8, 1964), p. 2; "PM Taps Diaspora to Realise Indian Ambition," *Times Of India* (January 7, 2001), electronic version.
97. M. Parthasarathy, "What Really Drives the New Entente?" *The Hindu* (September 20, 2000), electronic version.
98. S.P. Gupta, et al, eds., *Indo-US Trade and Economic Cooperation* (Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1995), p. 106.
99. "US to Review Economic Sanctions on India," *Indian Express* (January 18, 2001), electronic version.
100. "We Welcome India's Thinking Differently," *The Hindu* (June 19, 2001), p. 10.
101. During his July 1998 China visit, Bill Clinton thanked Zhu Rongji for helping "curb proliferation in South Asia," an insult to India considering China's export control record of dual-use technology is dubious.
102. Interview with Premen Addy, London (August 15, 2001).
103. "Pak Must Act on India's Request: Russia," *The Hindu* (February 8, 2001), electronic version.
104. Ghatate, *op. cit.*, pp. 97, 131.
105. Conversation with Spokesman for Overseas Friends of BJP, Gautam Sen, London (July 31, 2001).

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